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THESIS ABSTRACT 
 
Ian Blaise Cipperly 
 
Master of Arts 
 
Department of History 
 
June 2016 
 
Title: Tōshō Daigongen Shū: A Religious Source of Shogunal Legitimacy in Early 
Modern Japan 
 
 
Japan’s early modern period (1568-1868) achieved a break from the violent 
political and social upheaval of the preceding Warring States period (1467-1568). The 
return to a stable and more centralized rule was made possible by the development and 
implementation of an emerging politico-religious trend, in which powerful leaders were 
posthumously apotheosized and worshiped as tutelary deities. Ieyasu, the first of the 
Tokugawa shoguns, was deified and venerated at the Tōshōgū Shrine in Nikkō, and the 
politico-religious movement that was propagated by Ieyasu’s descendants became a 
central tool for the government’s legitimacy. Because Ieyasu’s cult was the only source 
of ideological legitimacy that was exclusive to the Tokugawa, the sources of Tokugawa 
success can be found by examining the development of the Nikkō shrine and its 
accompanying religious movement.   
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Prologue 
 
The Approach to Nikkō Tōshōgū 
 
 
 The rain had finally stopped. It was my last day in Nikkō, and while the showers 
had not kept me from venturing out to visit the Buddhist temples, Shinto shrines, 
museums, and books shops each day for the previous week, I was excited to enjoy at least 
one day without an umbrella. I arose at six to bathe with the other guests at the inn and 
then had breakfast served in my room, as is the custom.  As I sat on the woven reed 
tatami mats eating small grilled fish, slippery fermented beans, and various pickled 
mountain vegetables, I looked out the window at the wooded hillside that was finally 
soaking in the sun and wondered how different my experience would have been as a 
pilgrim visiting Nikkō in the seventeenth century. I left in a hurry after eating, 
apprehensive about the rain returning, but daring to decline the umbrella offered by the 
kimono-clad matron on my way through the exit curtain. I was off to spend one more day 
at the main Tōshōgū shrine and to walk the same tree-lined avenue tread by daimyo lords, 
foreign embassies, shogunal processions, and tourists for the past four centuries.  
 Nikkō is home to the Tōshōgū Shrine complex, the spiritual and geographic 
center of the first Tokugawa Shogun’s cult, and home to his deified spirit. This syncretic 
cult, a mix of Buddhist and Shinto beliefs and rituals, had been used to bolster the 
ideological legitimacy and longevity of the Tokugawa clan. The effect had been 
remarkable as it aided the Tokugawa in implementing a system of rule that witnessed the 
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end of the Warring States period and that ushered in two and a half centuries of peace. 
Foreign dignitaries and regional barons alike had come to worship the Daigongen and 
praise his legacy of peace and prosperity.  
 Nikkō is located one hundred and twenty-five kilometers due north of Tokyo. The 
Tōshōgū complex is nestled in a series of forested mountains, making for a comfortable 
climate in the often-oppressive heat of eastern Japan’s summers. Rivers and waterfalls 
adorn the wooded slopes like glistening jewels, ornamenting the forest that shelters 
numerous temples and shrines, some of which date back to the Nara period (710-794). 
The constant sound of running water, coupled with the soft ringing of glass wind chimes, 
imbues the shaded slopes with an otherworldly feeling.  
 Leaving my inn, I take the same path that pilgrims had been walking for four 
hundred years. Starting at the bottom of the valley, I pass the famed Shinkyō bridge, its 
lacquered vermilion wood arching elegantly over the turbulent Daiya river. The blood 
hued bridge is restricted from public use, just as it was in the Edo period (1603-1868). 
After crossing the river on an adjacent bridge, the ascent to the shrine complex becomes 
steep, requiring a series of staircases to guide visitors to the lower precincts of the Shrine. 
These stairs, like the rest of the shrine, are bordered by colossal cryptomeria trees, known 
here as sugi, and exalted as the national tree and religious symbol. In fact, Nikkō is home 
to the world’s longest tree lined boulevard: the sugi avenue. The sugi seem to stand 
watch, sentinels of the spirits housed in and around Tōshōgū.  
 Eventually, the stairs give way to a straight, pitched path. The sudden appearance 
of this direct lane leading up the mountain to the temple gate is jarring, and forces the 
visitor’s attention ahead to the subject of veneration, the deified shogun. The combination 
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of climbing from the river, the sounds of rushing water and chimes, and the two-hundred-
foot-tall sugi trees all serve to remind visitors how small and insignificant they are. I 
think of the lords, bannermen, and pilgrims who visited this shine in the formative years 
of the bakufu. Given the religiosity of the time, traversing the path to the Shrine would 
have been a sacred experience in its own right. Then, my thoughts shift to the foreign 
dignitaries from the Korean peninsula and the Okinawan islands who trod the same path 
over three and a half centuries ago. We know from their diaries that they were coerced to 
travel from Edo to Nikkō in order to be seen publicly venerating the deified shogun. 
Their experiences would have been very different in nature from those worshiping the 
shogun, but the splendid architecture and unusually vibrant colors of Tōshōgū surely 
impressed even the most recalcitrant of visitors.  
 The winding stairs leading from the Shinkyō bridge give way to the straight and 
cobbled slope directly under a massive granite torii gate. Visitors ascending the now 
straight path next come to the impressive Niomon gate. This gate, painted in the same 
bright red as the Shinkyō bridge and heavily gilded in gold leaf, demarcates the boundary 
between the secular world and the sacred outer shrine grounds. Visitors passing through 
the Niomon gate then proceed west, and subsequently north, through the elaborately 
decorated stables and storehouses. The path is lined by tens of large, free-standing stone 
lanterns dedicated to the shogun’s spirit by various domainal lords. After winding though 
these intricately decorated structures, visitors come to the most ornate and impressive 
structure in Nikkō: The Yomeimon gate.  
 The Yomeimon gate was as far as commoners were allowed to proceed during the 
early years of the bakufu. Perhaps this explains why such effort was put into creating this 
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impressive structure: to awe the masses who congregated here during festivals and 
pilgrimages. This massive gate is not only elaborately carved, but is also painted and 
gilded in bright reds, blues, greens, and gold. Images of dragons, lions, and the legendary 
sage kings of China are sculpted in relief and painted with incredible detail. Commoners 
viewing the gate were meant to think of the shogun and his descendants as the 
contemporary embodiment of the sage kings referenced by Confucius—wise and 
benevolent rulers. The bright colors and intricate carvings, quite unusual at the time, 
served to separate the Tokugawa shoguns from the mundane world of common men with 
splendor and spectacle.  
 
Introduction 
 
 The Nikkō Tōshōgū Shrine was constructed in preparation for the posthumous 
deification of the first Tokugawa shogun, Ieyasu (1543-1616).  The initial complex was 
completed just before the first anniversary of his death, in 1617.1 The shrine, and the 
religious movement that was founded there, would become a central tool used to foster 
the ideological legitimacy of the early shogunate. For, although Tokugawa dominance 
was achieved largely through threat or perpetration of violence, the early Tokugawa 
shoguns sought alternative sources of authority. The violence of the preceding Warring 
States period (1467-1600), which acted as the principal arbiter of political power at the 
time, was also the primary source of political and military instability. During this time of 
decentralized rule, military might superseded traditional sources of authority based on 
                                                        
1. Naohiro Asao, Sakoku (Tokyo: Shōgakkan, 1975), 171. 
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titles, lineage, or religious tradition. The Tokugawa sought to reverse the politico-military 
trend of the Warring States period, which historian Andrew E. Goble describes as “a 
transition from a reliance on the force of authority to a reliance on the authority of 
force.2” Accordingly, the early Tokugawa leaders sought the stabilization of their regime 
and the permanent establishment of the Tokugawa clan as the rulers of the Japanese 
Archipelago by eliminating alternate arbiters of violence. It was natural for the Tokugawa 
to seek ways to strengthen their claim to power that minimized the political instability 
that often accompany violence. One of the ways that the Tokugawa sought to curtail 
violence was by reestablishing a politico-religious ideology that would provide a non-
violent source of legitimacy. In other words, the cult centered on Ieyasu became a source 
of religious and ideological legitimacy so that the Tokugawa could bring an end to the 
political instability of the Warring States period.  
Last of the three great unifiers of Japan, Ieyasu sought to establish a new political 
and social order. His government, known as the Tokugawa bakufu, presided over a 
federation of some two hundred and fifty semi-autonomous domains known as han. The 
system of government, known as bakuhan taisei,  has been referred to alternately as 
either “centralized feudalism3”—for its similarities to the system of governance of 
medieval Europe in which land was bestowed by lord to vassal in exchange for service—
or, “federalist”—a term used by historians Mary Berry and Conrad Totman to describe 
                                                        
2. Andrew Edmund Goble, “War and Injury: The Emergence of Wound Medicine 
in Medieval Japan,” Monumenta Nipponica 60, no. 3 (2005): 297–338, 
doi:10.1353/mni.2005.0035, 297. 
3. Peter Duus author, Feudalism in Japan., Studies in World Civilization (New 
York, Knopf, 1969), 85. 
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both Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s unification government and Ieyasu’s bakufu, respectively.4 
These terms are useful in a generic sense, as the Tokugawa bakufu, while acting as the 
highest military and political authority in the land, left the governing and judicial 
enforcement within the various han to the regional lords known as daimyo. 
The bakuhan system, which would come to political and institutional maturity 
under the third Tokugawa shogun and grandson of Ieyasu, Iemitsu (1604-1651), was 
largely the continuation of institutional innovations and politico-religious ideology 
implemented by the first two great unifiers, Oda Nobunaga (1534-1582) and Toyotomi 
Hideyoshi (1536-1582). Under the first three Tokugawa shoguns, the most important 
institutional policies used to exercise dominance over the daimyo were the seizing of 
lands, or attainder; the implementation of the buke shohatto, or codes of conduct for the 
recently differentiated warrior class; and sankin kōtai, known as the alternate attendance 
system. Of course, there were other instruments of control, including a hierarchical 
restructuring of baronial lords, dominance of early domestic economic policy, and, 
nominally exclusive control of international trade. However, even these institutional 
systems shared a similar goal with the earlier mentioned political and social measures: 
the bakufu sought to contain and dominate the social elites of early modern Japan—first 
and foremost, the daimyo and their bushi warriors, and then, to a lesser extent, the 
imperial court and religious orders. Because of the top down nature of bakuhan taisei, the 
early bakufu was primarily concerned with governing the daimyo while allowing the 
daimyo, in turn, to govern their retainers and the commoners of non-Tokugawa han.  
                                                        
4. Mary E. Berry, Hideyoshi (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1982), 
chap. 6. Conrad Totman, Politics in the Tokugawa Bakufu, 1600-1843 (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 1967), 242.  
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Although the bakufu used a variety of institutional policies to dominate the 
daimyo, the early shoguns also sought other sources of political and social legitimacy. 
Among these other sources were various ideologies that came from Shinto and Buddhist 
traditions. In particular, the bakufu would utilize the religious movement founded at 
Nikkō Tōshōgū to raise the status of the Tokugawa house above the daimyo and imperial 
court.  
The use of religion to legitimize rule in Japan was not new to the Edo period. 
Religion has been used for political legitimacy on the Japanese archipelago since the 
earliest recorded times. Predating Japanese records, the History of Wei (ca. 297) reported 
the first named ruler of the Japanese archipelago to be a shaman called Pimiko. The 
Chinese chronicler went as far as to state that Pimiko had bewitched the people, clearly 
indicating a religious or otherworldly source of her political power and authority.5 The 
earliest indigenous record from Japan, the Kojiki (712), claimed divine descent for the 
imperial family.6 This claim was again forwarded and sophisticatedly enhanced by 
courtier Kitabatake Chikafusa (1293-1354) in his chronicle, the Jinnō Shōtōki (1339).7 As 
will be illustrated in the following chapter, although the authority of power superseded 
the power of authority during the Sengoku period, there were various religious 
                                                        
5. William Theodore De Bary et al., Sources of Japanese Tradition, 2nd ed., vol. 
1, Introduction to Asian Civilizations (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 6. 
6. David John Lu compiler, Sources of Japanese History (New York: McGraw-    
Hill, 1974), 1-19. 
7. Chikafusa Kitabatake, A Chronicle of Gods and Sovereigns: Jinnō Shōtōki of 
Kitabatake Chikafusa, Translations from the Oriental Classics (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1980). 
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developments during this time that laid fertile ground for the reemergence of religion as a 
source of transcendent authority not necessarily reliant on violence. Tōshōgū was the 
pinnacle of these developments, and served as a source of Tokugawa legitimacy until the 
demise of the bakufu.  
While there has been some discussion of Tōshōgū as a source of ideological 
legitimacy, this religious movement has been largely understudied when one considers 
the importance placed on it by the leaders of the early bakufu. This oversight can be 
attributed to one fact: the emphasis placed on Neo-Confucianism in the discussions of 
public ideology in Tokugawa Japan. 
Before exploring the reasons for this focus on Neo-Confucianism, it is necessary  
first to explore the meaning of ideology as it is used in this study. Conrad Totman defines 
ideology as “a coherent rationale for the established order.”8 However, such a definition 
precludes competing ideologies as well as ideologies seeking to form new sources of 
political and social legitimacy. In his chapter, “What is Ideology?” cultural theorist Terry 
Eagleton points out that there are many definitions for ideology, and that, because 
ideologies grow out of different circumstances and can have varying goals, the myriad 
definitions of ideology are not always compatible. Still, from Eagleton’s list of sixteen 
commonly used definitions of ideology, several serve to clarify the type of ideology that 
was propagated as Tōshōgū developed: 
(1) A body of ideas characteristic of a particular social group or class; 
(2) Ideas which help to legitimate a dominant political power; 
                                                        
8. Conrad D. Totman, Early Modern Japan (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1993). 
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(3) False ideas which help to legitimate a dominant political power; 
(4) That which offers a position for a subject; 
(5) Forms of thought motivated by social interests; 
(6) Socially necessary illusion; 
(7) The medium in which conscious social actors make sense of their world; 
(8) The indispensable medium in which individuals live out their relations to the 
social structure.9  
All of these definitions accurately describe the roles that Tōshōgū would come to play as 
a source of political, military, and social legitimacy. To be clear, Tōshōgū was not the 
only ideological tool used by the bakufu, although it was one of the most important and 
longest lasting.  
Ideology can be viewed as one side of a metaphorical coin that is required for the 
creation and maintenance of a government. The other side of this coin is comprised of 
institutional controls, such as the previously mentioned regulations and edicts issued by 
the bakufu. Philosopher Louis Althusser calls these two sides of this coin “Ideological” 
and “Repressive.” A government will always have some aspect of both sides of this coin, 
but the “Ideological” and “Repressive”—that is to say, the ideological and institutional—
characteristics are not often equally utilized to maintain the government. A government is 
either more reliant on institutions or on ideology, although both will always be present to 
some degree. As Althusser states, “Every State Apparatus, whether Repressive or 
Ideological, ‘functions’ both by violence and by ideology…the (Repressive) State 
Apparatus functions massively and predominantly by repression (including physical 
                                                        
9. Terry Eagleton, Ideology: An Introduction (London ; New York: Verso, 1991). 
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repression), while functioning secondarily by ideology…In the same way, but inversely, 
it is essential to say that for their part the Ideological State Apparatuses function 
massively and predominantly by ideology, but they also function secondarily by 
repression.”10 Furthermore, I contend that the “repressive” and “ideological” are not fixed 
in proportion relative to one another. The Tokugawa bakufu began as a “Repressive” 
government with its focus on institutional controls. But, as these controls became 
established, the bakufu began to focus more on ideology as a source of legitimacy and 
maintenance of authority. The first two Tokugawa shoguns personally fought in battles in 
order to maintain bakufu dominance. The third shogun, Iemitsu, never fought in battle 
himself, although he did have to suppress the Shimabara Rebellion in 1638. Still, as the 
third chapter of this study will show, Iemitsu was even more concerned with ideology 
than his father or grandfather, even as he also formally established the institutions 
introduced by his predecessors. Therefore, it might be said that from the inception of the 
bakufu in 1603 until the middle of the century, the bakufu shifted from a primarily 
“Repressive” government to a more “Ideological” governing apparatus.  
To date, ideology has been largely explored within the context of Tokugawa 
Japan by intellectual historians. And, since Neo-Confucianism was admittedly the most 
dominant expression of intellectual currents in Tokugawa Japan, it was only natural that 
there be a focus by intellectual historians on Neo-Confucianism to the exclusion of other 
earlier sources of ideological legitimacy.  
This fixation on Neo-Confucianism began with the earliest intellectual historians: 
the modernists. Historian Samuel Hideo Yamashita defines the modernists as those 
                                                        
10. Louis Althusser, Essays on Ideology (London: Verso, 1984), 19. 
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historians focusing on the history of popular thought and influential thinkers through the 
lens of structuralism, and who often imposed a western perspective on Japanese history. 
This necessarily led to a focus on Japanese westernization or modernization. Because 
these scholars viewed the Meiji Restoration as the watershed moment in Japanese history, 
they necessarily focused on the latter half of the Tokugawa period and onward. 
According to Yamashita, “the first scholars to work on early modern thinkers were 
interested mainly in those whose ideas fed into the Meiji Restoration and in what 
happened afterward—as the works of Robert Bellah, Richard Chang, Albert Craig, 
Ronald Dore, David Earl, Harry Harootunian, E. H Norman, and Herschel Webb 
reveal.11” Of course, the intellectual historians Masao Maruyama and Tetsuo Najita can 
be included in this modernity-focused group as well.  
There has been continuing exploration of Tokugawa Japan’s intellectual history in 
more recent years and much of it has dealt with ideology promoted in defense of bakufu 
authority. Perhaps influenced by the increasing popularity of social histories with a more 
local focus, as opposed to theory based histories attempting to fit the square peg of 
European models into the round hole of the Japanese experience, more recent scholars 
have examined Edo period ideologues as men contextualized within their own time and 
place. This trend was also bolstered by the emergence of postmodernism, which cautions 
us to accept the entirely subjective nature of writing history. Kate Nakai’s Shogunal 
Politics: Arai Hakuseki and the Premises of Tokugawa Rule, Samuel Yamashita’s Master 
Sorai’s Responsals: an Annotated Translation of Sorai Sensei Tōmonsho, and Peter 
                                                        
11. Samuel Yamashita, “Reading the New Tokugawa Intellectual Histories,” 
Journal of Japanese Studies 22, no. 1 (1996): 2. 
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Nosco’s Edo Shakai to Kokugaku are examples of works that have done an admirable job 
of examining their subjects without forcing contrived theoretical frameworks onto them. 
Still, if we look at when their protagonists contributed to the intellectual currents of 
Tokugawa Japan, it becomes clear that all of these figures came to prominence after the 
bakufu had been established and was in many ways already in its decline. Arai Hakuseki 
(1657-1725), Ōgyu Sorai (1666-1728), as well as the Nativist school popularized in part 
by Motoori Norinaga (1730-1801), all wrote their works after the Genroku period (1688-
1704).  
In some ways, the bakufu reached its zenith under the third shogun, Iemitsu. The 
first three Tokugawa shoguns, Ieyasu, Hidetada, and Iemitsu, all exercised supreme 
authority over the shogunate. It was from the fourth shogun forward that the singular 
authority of the shogun began to suffer the effects of entropy as power began to gradually 
be shared by others. Conrad Totman’s chronological division of the Tokugawa bakufu 
into three phases highlights this gradual dissipation of authority from center to periphery: 
“1603-1666, shogunal rule; 1666-1787, grand chamberlain rule; 1787-1843, perfection of 
the chief councillor [sic] rule.”12 Furthermore, while the Genroku period is often called 
the golden age of the Edo period, by this time the bakufu’s authority was waning in other 
ways. Direct shogunal control of domestic economies had been continually weakened and 
possession of wealth had begun to shift from the bushi to the chōnin, or city folk.13 All of 
this trouble is what drove the Neo-Confucians to break from orthodoxy in order to make 
                                                        
12. Totman, Politics in the Tokugawa Bakufu, 230. 
 
13. Conrad Totman, Early Modern Japan (London: University of California 
Press, 1993), 101-103. 
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sense of the inability of the bakufu to maintain social and political norms. And, while this 
may correctly imply that the early years of the bakufu did not give birth to a torrent of 
intellectual currents, that in no way means that there were no other forms of legitimizing 
ideology being brought to bear by the early shoguns, including Tōshōgū.  
Doubtless, there will be those who point to the orthodox school of Neo-
Confucianism of the Hayashi family as proof that the bakufu was invested in and actively 
utilizing Neo-Confucianism from the onset of the Tokugawa period. But the facts do not 
bear this out. According to historian Herman Ooms, “the early Tokugawa bakufu under 
the first four shoguns did not “respond” to Neo-Confucianism: there existed neither 
privileged institutional support for it, nor any directives from above for the imposition of 
a well formulated ideology.14” A brief comparison of shogunal treatment of the early 
scions of Neo-Confucianism with that of Buddhist practitioners and institutions 
highlights early bakufu attitudes towards Neo-Confucianism on the one hand, and, 
Buddhism on the other. Suffice it to say that the early shoguns’ actions displayed great 
support of, and interest in, Buddhist and Shinto platforms of legitimacy but little or no 
interest in Neo-Confucianism.  
In 1614 Ieyasu refused the request of Neo-Confucian scholar, Hayashi Razan, to 
open a school to be run by his teacher, Fujiwara Seika. In fact, only in 1630, and after 
twenty-five years as service as a clerk of the shogunate, was Razan given 200 ryō to open 
a small school for some thirty students.15 Compare this to Iemitsu’s gift of 500,000 ryō to 
                                                        
14. Peter Nosco, Confucianism and Tokugawa Culture (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1984), 35. 
 
15. Ibid, 33. 
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Tenkai, founder of the Nikkō Tōshōgū—a full seventh of the bakufu’s treasury.16 Tenkai 
was also earlier granted 50,000 ryō and construction materials for the establishment of 
Kan’eiji temple north of Edo.17 Clearly, the early Tokugawa shoguns placed a great deal 
of importance on the ideas being presented by the priest, Tenkai. Indeed, as Ooms points 
out regarding Tenkai and Nikkō Tōshōgū, “From the beginning, he was far more 
influential than Razan, who had been hired three years earlier, and contributed more than 
Razan ever did to “legitimize” Tokugawa rule. If anyone deserves to be called a bakufu 
ideologue, it is he.18” Here, Ooms is pointing to Tenkai’s creation of the Tōshōgū shrine 
and its accompanying politico-religious movement as the height of early bakufu 
ideological legitimacy.  
The above discussion speaks implicitly to the importance of Tōshōgū. First, while 
Neo-Confucianism would come to dominate popular and intellectual thought of the later 
Edo period, it was not particularly influential in the formative years of the bakufu. 
Second, the later prominence of Neo-Confucianism does not imply that there were not 
other sources of authority being sought out by the early rulers of the Edo period. Rather, 
the early shoguns sought nonviolent sources of political legitimacy in religion, a point 
that will be expanded upon in the next chapter. Finally, as the bakufu had in some ways 
come to maturity under the third shogun, Iemitsu, and in other ways by the Genroku 
period, it is unfortunate that there has been a dearth of investigatory studies into the non-
                                                        
16. Totman, Politics in the Tokugawa Bakufu, 77, 82.  
 
17. Nosco, Confucianism and Tokugawa Culture, 32. 
 
18. Herman Ooms, Tokugawa Ideology Early Constructs, 1570-1680 (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 173. 
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institutional sources of early bakufu authority. This study explores Tōshōgū in this light 
and tackles the following questions: How and why was Tōshōgū embraced as a means of 
politico-religious legitimacy? In what ways did Tōshōgū evolve under the first three 
shoguns? And, how was Tōshōgū specifically used as a tool of political legitimization?  
The thesis of each of the following chapters is in answer to these questions. In 
chapter two, the reasoning and agency behind the foundation of Tōshōgū will be 
explored. It will be made clear that the initial agency providing impetus for the creation 
of the Nikkō shrine lay in the machinations of the Tendai priest, Tenkai. Tenkai, who 
served as advisor to the first four Tokugawa shoguns, embraced Ieyasu’s desire to be 
deified with gusto. Chapter three explores the architectural aggrandizement, proliferation 
of satellite shrines, and subsequent pilgrimages to the main shrine in Nikkō that took 
place under the third shogun, Iemitsu. Iemitsu had various reasons to further embrace 
alternate sources of bakufu legitimacy, and his focus on Tōshōgū marked a shift in the 
driving force behind the shrine from Tenkai to the office of the shogun. This shift in 
agency enabled the completion of the costliest and most elaborate construction project of 
the first half of the Seventeenth Century. Finally, the fourth chapter explores just how the 
Nikkō shrine was utilized as a tool for political legitimacy. Specifically, Iemitsu used the 
shrine to build up bakufu prestige by coercing the imperial court to recognize the shrine 
as being equal to the imperial shrines at Ise. Furthermore, Iemitsu and Tenkai pressured 
the court to create the Tōshōsha Engi, a document that forwarded a fabricated history of 
the Tokugawa and further strengthened the legitimacy of the bakufu. Finally, Iemitsu also 
compelled the Korean imperial court to send embassies bearing gifts to Nikkō. These 
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public processions were meant to elevate the perceived international standing of the 
bakufu in the eyes of the Daimyo, imperial court, and commoners of early modern Japan.  
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CHAPTER II 
THE GENESIS OF TŌSHŌGŪ 
 
 
Or I shall live your epitaph to make, 
Or you survive when I in earth am rotten; 
From hence your memory death cannot take, 
Although in me each part will be forgotten. 
Your name from hence immortal life shall have, 
Though I, once gone, to all the world must die: 
The earth can yield me but a common grave, 
When you entombed in men's eyes shall lie. 
Your monument shall be my gentle verse, 
Which eyes not yet created shall o'er-read, 
And tongues to be your being shall rehearse, 
When all the breathers of this world are dead; 
   You still shall live (such virtue hath my pen)  
   Where breath most breathes, even in the mouths of men. 
 
—William Shakespeare, Sonnet eighty-one 
 
 
 
 
Genna 2/4/1719 
It was a gloomy spring morning in Suruga province, and the mood at Sunpu 
castle was dark.20 Ieyasu, first of the Tokugawa shoguns and last of the great unifiers, 
was dead. He passed in the presence of his successor and son, Hidetada, who had 
journeyed from Edo to be with his father during his long illness. Just as three concentric 
walls protected Sunpu castle, three types of free standing folding screens shielded Ieyasu 
within his sickroom. The outermost screens of hardwood latticework enclosed the next 
ring of lightweight bamboo screens. The third and innermost partition displayed black 
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ink sumi-e style painting on paper, reflecting the subdued taste of its late owner. Ladies 
in waiting now reverently lowered these screens, which had been placed to keep drafts 
from the ailing lord.21 The room would have been quiet, save the muted sounds of the 
servants moving about, feet sliding along the tatami mat floor. Hidetada sat quietly on the 
tatami, breathing in the heavy incense wafting from the brazier next to his father’s body, 
and likely thought of how best to honor the varied commands Ieyasu had issued during 
his final weeks. Perhaps Hidetada found it peculiar how this somber scene belied the 
constant bustle that had accompanied Ieyasu’s protracted illness.  
 
Fig. 1, A depiction of Ieyasu’s death at Sunpu from the 1640 Engi scroll. Shigemi Komatsu and Mitsuharu 
Kanzaki, Tōshōsha Engi (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1994), 73. 
 
The sick chamber had been the locus of frantic activity these past three months. 
Ieyasu had been hawking in the wooded hills surrounding the castle town of Sunpu near 
the end of the first month when he first fell ill.22 The symptoms—a tight chest, fatigue—
                                                        
21. Shigemi Komatsu and Mitsuharu Kanzaki, Tōshōsha Engi (Tokyo: Chūō 
Kōronsha, 1994), 73. 
22. First month of the second year of Genna (March 8, 1616), according to the 
lunar calendar. 
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suggested he likely suffered a mild heart attack. 23 Ieyasu, who had taken the title of 
ōgosho, or retired shogun, upon his official abdication was still the de facto ruler, and 
news of his illness spread quickly. The castle town surrounding Sunpu filled, and Ieyasu, 
whose illness wavered in severity, held countless meetings, signed documents, and 
sought counsel from political and religious leaders.24 The imperial court had even sent a 
delegation to award Ieyasu the title of imperial prime minister.25  
 At the time of his death, Tokugawa Ieyasu (1543-1616) was the preeminent 
warlord of the Japanese archipelago, and for two and a half centuries his heirs would go 
on to hold the highest post afforded a warrior, shogun. There is disagreement among 
scholars over how much credit Ieyasu deserves for bringing peace and a semblance of 
unity to the archipelago. The notion that Ieyasu’s successes were the result of the labors 
of the two preceding hegemons, Oda Nobunaga and Toyotomi Hideyoshi, is reflected in 
the often repeated saying: Nobunaga pounded the mochi for the rice cake, Hideyoshi 
baked it in fire, and Ieyasu sat back and ate it. Although it is true that Nobunaga and 
Hideyoshi did much to remove or suppress rival sources of authority as well as establish 
institutional innovations that moved the archipelago towards stability and a more 
centralized rule, neither hegemon was able to perpetuate their rule beyond a generation. 
Ieyasu, on the other hand, was able to build upon evolving political and religious 
institutions to ensure the longevity of his lineage.  
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 Ieyasu was acutely aware of the transient nature of authority. Born during the 
Warring States period, which was epitomized by the phenomenon of gekokujō, or the low 
overthrowing their superiors, Ieyasu had been helpless to stop his lord Nobunaga’s 
assassination by the treacherous general, Akechi Mitsuhide, at Honnoji in 1582. Sixteen 
years later, Ieyasu himself would betray both his oath and Hideyoshi’s son by laying 
siege to Osaka Castle in order to eliminate the challenge posed to Tokugawa authority by 
the young Toyotomi. This episode was likely disheartening for Ieyasu as he seemed to 
have had affection for Toyotomi Hideyori and showed reticence in taking action against 
the inheritor of the Toyotomi name. Nevertheless, the ambitious machinations of 
Hideyori’s mother, coupled with the growing support of rival daimyo, large numbers of 
dissatisfied rōnin, and the imperial court, forced Ieyasu’s hand. After witnessing and 
participating in these key events so representative of the period, Ieyasu became fixated on 
the importance of succession. 
 Ieyasu also had more personal reasons that forced his attention to matters of 
Tokugawa legacy. Ieyasu’s first chosen heir had met with a tragic end. In 1570, after 
becoming a vassal of Oda Nobunaga, Ieyasu had moved from Okazaki to Hamamatsu. He 
left his first born son and successor, Nobuyasu, to manage the area and care for Ieyasu’s 
wife of over two decades. Tragically for the immediate future of the Tokugawa line, 
Nobuyasu was implicated in a seditious plot against Nobunaga, who ordered Ieyasu to 
deal with the upstart. Ieyasu placed Nobuyasu under house arrest, no doubt trying to find 
a way out of the predicament. Alas, no escape was found, and a month and a half later, 
Ieyasu ordered his first son to disembowel himself.26 This incident was not the last time 
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one of Ieyasu’s children would die young. Ieyasu’s fifth son, Nobuyoshi, died at twenty 
in 1603. In 1607, two more of Ieyasu’s sons, both of whom were promising lords, died. 
Tadayoshi was the daimyo of Kiyosu and Hideyasu, who was daimyo of Fukui.27 These 
last two deaths would have made Ieyasu hyperaware of the importance of securing a 
lasting lineage.  
Concerned over the perpetuation of his clan’s position, Ieyasu took a number of 
novel measures. In addition to codifying many of the institutional innovations utilized by 
the first two unifiers such as the elimination of the landed warrior class, the right to 
impose attainder, and the issuing of highly restrictive codes of conduct for the warrior 
class, court, and clergy, Ieyasu also paid special attention to matters of lineage. First, 
although he maintained all actual authority, Ieyasu abdicated in favor of his son, Hidetada 
(1579-1632) in 1605, passing the title of shogun to the next Tokugawa after holding the 
position for only two years. This would ensure that Hidetada would have the guidance of 
the wizened Ieyasu as well as the loyalty of his supporters. With Ieyasu maintaining de 
facto political control under the auspices of ōgosho, or retired shogun, the council of 
elders would be eased into their positions as subordinates to Hidetada. This shrewd 
maneuver by the first Tokugawa minimized possible resentments from men who had 
more experience than Hidetada. Ieyasu also proclaimed that Hidetada’s son, Iemitsu 
(1604-1651), would inherit the title of shogun—a decision that ran counter to Hidetada’s 
preference.28 Ieyasu had done what he could to avoid the common occurrence of bloody 
succession disputes by ensuring the next two generations of Tokugawa rule.  
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Next, Ieyasu arranged the regional lords, or daimyo, into three categories. Those 
loyal to Ieyasu at the battle of Sekigahara (1600) were honored as fudai daimyo, or 
hereditary lords. Those who had stood against the victorious Ieyasu and survived—albeit 
with reduced lands and titles—were known as tozama daimyo, or outside lords. Finally, 
and of particular relevance here, the branch families of the Tokugawa were granted the 
special status of shinpan daimyo, or collateral daimyo. Ieyasu designated these branch 
families as shinpan to serve as a source of heirs to the position of shogun should Ieyasu’s 
main line fail to produce. Ieyasu prudently kept the shinpan daimyo and their men far 
removed from the politics and inner workings of the Tokugawa government, or bakufu. 
This meant that the collateral houses would survive in high standing and be ready to 
provide an heir if needed, but would be less able to manipulate the circumstances of 
succession because they were kept separate from the highest levels of government.  These 
three measures, the early passing of the title shogun to Hidetada, the assignment of 
Iemitsu to the position of third shogun, and the establishment of the shinpan daimyo, 
highlight Ieyasu’s preoccupation with ensuring the continuation of his line. But, perhaps 
recognizing that institutions alone were insufficient to ensure Tokugawa rule, Ieyasu 
again looked to his predecessors to find novel forms of authority.  
Ieyasu sought a source of legitimacy that would transcend the limitations of man-
made law and found what he was looking for in the recently emerging politico-religious 
practice of deification. The Tokugawa patriarch had worriedly observed the deification of 
his predecessor, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and the subsequent proliferation of his cult. The 
popular movement, centered on the deified Hideyoshi, had spread like wildfire and was 
only successfully pushed underground after the Tokugawa victory against the late 
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Hideyoshi’s son and his supporters at Osaka in 1615. Ieyasu, and all of the shoguns who 
followed him, would utilize a religious movement similar to Hideyoshi’s to strengthen 
bakufu legitimacy both domestically and abroad. This buttressing of legitimacy would be 
achieved through a combination of spectacular architecture at Tōshōgū, pageantry 
surrounding shogunal processions to the Nikkō shrine, the cajoling of foreign embassies 
into worshiping Ieyasu’s deified spirit, and the strong-arming of the imperial court into 
aggrandizing the formal prestige of Ieyasu’s shrine. Ieyasu’s cult would be centered on 
the deified shogun and would be utilized to raise the bakufu’s political and social 
standing above the daimyo, foreign embassies, and even the imperial court.  
The story of the rise of the cult of Ieyasu is as complex as the myriad personalities 
that helped to create it. Indeed, throughout the genesis and evolution of this movement, 
the top advisers to the shogun would fight over protocol, precedent, and control of this 
powerful new political tool. Among these top advisers, the rival Buddhist priests Tenkai 
and Sūden would fight over all aspects of the fledgling cult. From the posthumous name 
of their deified lord to the geographic and spiritual center of the main shrine, no detail 
went uncontested as these two clerics maneuvered for power and influence.  
 
Genna 2/4/2 
 
Two weeks prior to Ieyasu’s death, Tenkai, Sūden, and the daimyo, Honda 
Masazumi, attended to the ailing lord in his sickroom at Sunpu Castle. Tenkai had never 
liked the Zen monk Sūden and was sitting uncomfortably close to him. The two priests not 
only vied for the attention of their lord, but also competed over the political and religious 
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territory of the Islands. Sūden, the Rinzai Zen abbot of Nanzenji in Kyoto, sought to 
expand his influence eastward into the new military capital of Edo and its surrounds. But 
this area was Tenkai’s. He had been at Kita’in Temple, northwest of Edo, since 1588 and 
had eventually become abbot there.29 In Tenkai’s mind, Kita’in would be the Enryakuji of 
the east, the religious bastion legitimizing Edo as a center of power just as the Tendai 
temple complex of Mount Hiei had done for Kyoto before being razed by Nobunaga in 
1573.30 
 Tenkai had settled neatly on the reed mat floor, the golden robes of his Tendai 
order set off by his dark shawl. He was slender and his face was gaunt, and he sat 
erectly, the product of his many decades of monastic training. He was also old, much 
older than his lord, Ieyasu, who lay dying before him. This was Tenkai’s eightieth 
summer, and he would see many more. According to the Chronicle of Tenshō, Tenkai had 
first met Ieyasu in 1590. Hideyoshi had just installed Ieyasu at Edo after crushing the 
Hōjō Clan at Odawara Castle.31 From that point on Tenkai had continued to gain 
influence in Ieyasu’s court and had been given official control of Kita’in as well as 
Rinnōji by the bakufu in 1613.32 But now, his lord’s life was fading, and Tenkai sensed 
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both opportunity and danger. There was much to accomplish, and Sūden surely thought 
the same.   
Fig. 2, A depiction of Tenkai giving instruction to Ieyasu from the 1640 engi scroll. Shigemi Komatsu and 
Mitsuharu Kanzaki, Tōshōsha Engi (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1994), 47. 
 
By the beginning of the fourth month of the lunar calendar one of Ieyasu’s 
retainers recorded that the ōgosho was “very ill; he can no longer eat, is sick and fevered, 
and it may be said that his passing is imminent.”33 For the next two weeks, the flagging 
shogun issued a number of instructions to his followers and councilors. Concerning his 
interment and deification, none was as important, nor the source of more controversy, 
than his testament recorded by Sūden and witnessed by Tenkai and the daimyo Honda 
Masazumi. In this pronouncement, Ieyasu revealed his continuing commitment to his 
family’s Pure Land Buddhist roots while also clearly showing his desire to embrace the 
emerging trend of hegemonic deification for the preservation of legacy. Sūden’s diary, 
the Honkō Kokushi Nikki, reads,  
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自分が死んだら死体は久能山におさめ、葬礼
そうれい
は増上寺
ぞうじょうじ
で行ない
お こ な い
、位牌
い は い
を三
河の大樹寺
だいじゅじ
に立て、一周忌
一しゅうき
を過
す
ぎてのち、日光に小さな堂を建てて勧請
かんじょう
せよ、そうすれば八州の鎮守
ちんじゅ
となろう、といった。34 
 
 
When I die, inter my corpse on Mount Kunō, perform the funeral at Zōjō Temple, 
and erect my funeral placard at Daiju Temple in Mikawa. On the first anniversary, 
build a small temple hall at Nikkō and invite my spirit to reside there. If you do 
these things, I will protect the Eight Provinces in perpetuity.  
 
 
 
Ieyasu’s complex set of instructions was not unusual considering his position as hegemon. 
This status, coupled with his desire to buttress his family’s legacy as rulers, necessitated 
the spending of ideological capital and the shoring up of traditionally important lineages 
while also incorporating newer sources of legitimacy found in the emerging trend of 
deification. Nor was it unusual for Ieyasu to partake in myriad rituals from various 
Buddhist and Shinto schools.  
 Ieyasu’s more conservative side found expression in the middle section of his 
testament. Here, the dying shogun admonished his followers to hold his funeral at Zōjōji, 
the Tokugawa family’s Pure Land temple in Edo. He next requested that his ihai, or 
funeral placard, be placed at Daijuji, a Pure Land temple in his Matsudaira clan’s 
homeland, Mikawa. In this way his spirit could be worshiped alongside his other 
ancestors whose placards were also housed in Daiju temple. While holding the funeral at 
Zōjōji made sense traditionally and logistically—the Matsudaira clan had long ties with 
Pure Land Buddhism and a funeral held in Edo would be a grander affair than one 
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performed in the backwater of Mikawa—Ieyasu had another reason to honor the 
traditions of the Matsudaira clan. During his rise to power, Ieyasu had taken the name 
Tokugawa in favor of his previous surname, Matsudaira. From this point on, Ieyasu 
claimed imperial decent from the Minamoto clan for the Tokugawa and by extension the 
Matsudaira, a move designed to legitimize his rule. The Minamoto were not only 
descendants of the imperial line, but also the only family who had held the title of shogun. 
The imperial court was happy enough to indulge Ieyasu’s pretentions, and had awarded 
Ieyasu the title of Genji no Chōja, or head of the Genji clan, together with the title of 
shogun.35 By honoring his ancestors who were ostensibly imperial and shogunal 
decedents, Ieyasu emphasized his story of connection to past military rulers and courtiers.  
 Ieyasu’s more innovative side becomes clear at the beginning and conclusion of 
his testament. In asking to be interred on Mount Kunō, a coastal site just three miles to 
the east of Sunpu castle, Ieyasu embraced the trend of Shinto deification, which had 
emerged from the late medieval Shinto theology of the Yoshida school. The Tokugawa 
bakufu had seen how powerful this use of religion could be when the followers of his 
predecessor, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, deified their late liege lord. The Toyotomi cult spread 
quickly among both the warriors and common folk, alarming Ieyasu and prompting him 
to seize the lands and most of the buildings of the central shrine of Hideyoshi’s Toyokuni 
Cult after the battle of Osaka.36   
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 Ieyasu concludes his testament by commanding that a hall be built north of Edo at 
Nikkō and that his spirit be invited there, where it should be worshiped. This notion of 
inviting a spirit, or kanjō, follows the trend of the earlier Toyokuni followers, who had 
similarly invited partitioned portions of Hideyoshi’s Hōkoku Daimyōjin kami to reside at 
various shrines. Finally, Ieyasu promises that if his testament is fulfilled he will become a 
tutelary deity, or chinja, and protect the eight provinces. The term used for the eight 
provinces, hasshū, literally denoted the provinces of the Kanto region, but colloquially 
referred to all of Japan.37 
 After issuing his last will and testament on the second day of the fourth month 
Ieyasu had recovered partially and resumed eating and meeting with his advisers. But, 
from the eleventh day onward, the retired shogun’s health began a rapid decline. On the 
fifteenth of the same month, Hidetada, concerned for his father, summoned the top 
religious consultants of the bakufu to consult on the proper rites of deification.38 Ieyasu 
had already established a practice of surrounding himself with “men of talent.” That is to 
say, Ieyasu had made a habit of finding the most capable men in their respective fields 
and elevating them in status while relying on their support and counsel. The two priests 
who Ieyasu promoted most aggressively were the rivals, Tenkai and Sūden. It was these 
two men who Hidetada summoned to advise on Ieyasu’s instructions. However, Sūden 
also brought with him Bonshun, who along with his half-brother, Kanemi, was a leading 
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figure in Yoshida Shinto and had carried out the ritual deification of Hideyoshi.39 
Yoshida Shinto, founded by Yoshida—or Urabe—Kanetomo (1435-1511) sought to 
create a system of Shinto completely divorced from Buddhism. Of course, Shinto and 
Buddhism had, by the time of Kanetomo, become so theologically entwined that a true 
separation was impossible. Still, Kanetomo did make some unique theological changes in 
his new school of Shinto. Most importantly, Kanetomo inverted the traditional 
theological arrangement that placed the Bodhisattva in a superior position to the native 
kami. Kanetomo contended that Buddhas were temporary manifestations of the kami, and 
that the native kami were original and fundamental.40 This inversion of the established 
relationship between the kami and the Buddhas and bodhisattvas, known as honji suijaku, 
was a major theological development and would later influence the Nativist school. Scion 
of the Yoshida school, Bonshun was already close to Sūden, who had likely already 
introduced Bonshun to Hidetada. Two days after the meeting between Hidetada and 
Bonshun, Ieyasu died. The same night, Ieyasu’s corpse was taken to the nearby Mount 
Kunō and prepared for the coming ritual.   
 The diaries of Bonshun, Sūden, and Tenkai plainly state that Bonshun deified 
Ieyasu in accordance with Yoshida Shinto ritual.41 As Tenkai would later record in his 
chronicle, the Jigen Daishi Engi, “A certain Sūden had cajoled Honda Masazumi and had 
come to an arrangement with a bastard of the Yoshida. Tenkai had not been admitted to 
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the ceremony and hence had not been able to prevent Ieyasu being deified according to 
Shinto rites.”42 The bastard Tenkai referred to was Bonshun, who was, indeed, a bastard 
and could therefore not carry the Yoshida name nor hold court rank as his father and half-
brother did. And, when Tenkai complained that his lord was deified according to Shinto 
rites, he specifically meant Yoshida Shinto rites, for soon after Bonshun’s ritual on 
Kunōzan Tenkai would have other ideas about how Ieyasu should have become a tutelary 
god. Specifically, Tenkai would later insist that Ieyasu had requested to be deified 
according to Tenkai’s own brand of Shinto, Sannō Ichijitsu Shinto. Still, it should not 
have been surprising to Tenkai that Ieyasu was interred according to Yoshida Shinto rites, 
as this followed the precedence of Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s earlier deification as Hokoku 
Daimyōjin by Bonshun and his half-brother, Yoshida Kanemi.43 Still, Tenkai’s 
dissatisfaction with the situation was made clear in his chronicle, and Sūden and 
Bonshun’s victory would not be long lived.  
Tenkai complained bitterly to Hidetada about the Yoshida rites being used as well 
as the location of the interment. According to Tenkai, Ieyasu had actually wanted to be 
buried according to Tenkai’s Sannō Ichijitsu rites, to which Ieyasu had been secretly 
initiated. While there is no evidence to support the former shogun’s initiation to Tenkai’s 
rites, there is a letter from daimyo Date Masamune stating that, “Ieyasu had decreed…his 
body should be placed on Kunōzan and that a temple should be built in Nikkō; as soon as 
this temple would be ready his body should be brought there.”44 This letter, found in the 
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history, the Dai Nihon Shiryō, is dated Genna 2/4/2, the same day as Ieyasu’s testament 
in Sūden’s diary. It is unclear whether it was Masamune’s letter or by some other means, 
but Tenkai did find the ear of Hidetada and succeeded in convincing the second shogun 
of the superiority of the Tendai Sannō Ichijitsu Shinto rites over those of the Yoshida 
clan. Among other theological differences with the Yoshida, Tenkai had reverted the 
honji suijaku relationship between kami and Buddha, returning supremacy to the 
Buddhist deities. Perhaps this helped to persuade Hidetada, who would have recognized 
his father as a devout Buddhist and pupil of Tenkai. This still seems odd, as Tenkai’s plan 
seems to contradict Ieyasu’s last will and testament, which only mentions building a 
small hall at Nikkō and inviting a portion of Ieyasu’s spirit to reside there. Still, if Sūden 
had been favored by Ieyasu, Tenkai was Ieyasu’s favorite.  
Tenkai had been born a member of the Ashina clan in Aizu. He left home at 
eleven to travel the Kanto and Kamigata regions seeking knowledge. In addition to 
studying the Tendai school, Tenkai, then known as Zuifu, also studied the Nara school, 
Zen, Confucianism, and the Nihongi. Tenkai first met Ieyasu in 1590, although their 
formal relationship would not begin until 1607. In that year, Ieyasu sent Tenkai on a 
pilgrimage before formally receiving the priest. From that point onward, Tenkai was 
showered with titles, lands, and wealth. The Tendai priest would go on to rebuild 
Enryakuji at Hieizan, and become the head of the entire order. Ieyasu saw Tenkai as more 
than an adviser. Tenkai became Ieyasu’s teacher, and so it is not surprising that Hidetada 
would be swayed by the Tendai priest.45 Tenkai would also go on to advise the first four 
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Tokugawa shoguns, illustrating a longevity to his influence outstripping even that of 
Sūden.  
After Tenkai’s theological victory over Sūden and one year after Ieyasu’s death, 
Tenkai had the shogun’s corpse exhumed and moved north to Nikkō.46 Here Tenkai 
performed the new set of rituals partially adopted from the Sannō Shinto of Mount Hiei. 
This time Ieyasu was re-deified as Tōshō Daigongen, making him more a Buddhist avatar 
than a Shinto kami, and immediately new shrines devoted to the Daigongen began 
appearing in rapid succession.  
It should be noted that the official stance of Tōshōgū Shrine officials at Nikkō is 
that the testament recorded by Sūden showed that Ieyasu desired that his corpse be 
moved from Kunōzan to Nikkō on the anniversary of his death. However, the term kanjō 
had already been used in a similar situation when Hideyoshi’s spirit was invited to come 
to other shrines. Hideyoshi’s body was not exhumed; rather, his spirit was partitioned and 
thought to reside in multiple places at once. Therefore, the moving of Ieyasu’s body to 
Nikkō had less to do with Ieyasu’s wishes than it did with Tenkai’s ambition. 
Furthermore, there is no evidence that there was any such sect of Shinto or Buddhism 
called Sannō Ichijitsu Shinto prior to Tenkai’s remonstrations—although there was a 
Sannō Gongen worshiped as an avatar on Mount Hiei, the historic and spiritual center of 
Tenkai’s Tendai sect. It seems as though Tenkai invented an amalgamation of Yoshida 
Shinto and the Tendai sect’s version of ryobu Shinto, the syncretic practice of indigenous 
Shinto alongside Buddhism.  
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In 1617 the new shrine at Nikkō, named after Ieyasu’s Sannō Shinto posthumous 
name, Tōshō Daigongen, had just been completed.47 Here we may have another clue as to 
why Hidetada decided to side with Tenkai and his possibly fabricated Sannō Ichijitsu 
Shinto. Under the Yoshida rites which operated with the inverted honji suijaku, Ieyasu’s 
tutelary deity’s name would have been Daimyōjin, not Daigongen. Daimyōjin was the 
same Yoshida Shinto name given to Hideyoshi, whose authority had been a threat to the 
Tokugawa, even in death. Therefore, by taking the Tendai Sannō Shinto name of Tōshō 
Daigongen rather than the Shinto name of Daimyōjin, Hidetada differentiated himself and 
his house from the previous hegemon by honoring the traditional arrangement of 
Buddhist supremacy over Shinto. That the Toyotomi were still viewed as a threat well 
after Hideyoshi’s death was made apparent in Ieyasu’s confiscation of most of 
Hideyoshi’s Hokoku shrine in 1615. Following his father’s lead, Hidetada confiscated the 
rest of the buildings in 1620.48  
 There is another interpretation of Hidetada’s decision as well. If we accept that all 
involved in these maneuverings were religious, we must think about how the Tokugawa 
and their followers would have viewed the protective power of Hideyoshi’s tutelary 
deity, Hokoku Daimyōjin. In 1615 Ieyasu eliminated Hideyoshi’s heir and routed the 
Toyotomi followers at the battle of Osaka. Here, Tenkai would have had another 
powerful argument against the use of the Yoshida Shinto name, Daimyōjin. The godhead 
of the Yoshida had failed to protect the Toyotomi clan and was therefore an unfit model 
to serve the relatively young Tokugawa clan. In this way, Tenkai was able to argue for 
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the superiority of his Sannō Shinto over the Yoshida school—a natural inclination to 
have for a Tendai priest.  
 
A Matter of Precedent 
 
To better understand why Ieyasu sought to emulate Hideyoshi’s deification it is 
helpful to examine the historical context and similar goals held by preceding men-turned-
tutelary deities. Despite the fact that the deification of dead men, and even some living 
men for that matter, had become common by the mid-Tokugawa period (1603-1868), it 
was still a novel practice in the early seventeenth century. According to historian Wim 
Boot, in preceding centuries, there had been “only a handful of cases” of the deification 
of men, and that includes instances that are most likely folk tales—the emperor Ōjin 
becoming Hachiman—as well as examples where a man was deified simply to keep his 
angry spirit placated, as in the case of Sugawara Michizane.49 Boot goes even further to 
posit that the worship of deified ancestors at a tomb was a later trend, which only came 
about in the medieval era.50  
The earliest historical case of tutelary deification is that of Nakatomi no Kamatari 
(614-669), who would become the first of the Fujiwara line. Kamatari was born into a 
sub-branch of the Nakatomi clan, which maintained the Kashira shrine.51 The members of 
the main branch of the Nakatomi clan had traditionally served as intermediaries between 
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the native deities known as kami and the court. Kamatari, who had come to court in his 
youth, went on to spearhead a coup d’état against the ruling Soga clan.52 From this point 
on, Kamatari served as the unofficial regent and was the architect of the Taika Reform. 
This reform pushed to increase central bureaucratic control over the numerous semi-
autonomous clans.53 Nakatomi Kamatari was awarded First Rank and given the clan 
name of Fujiwara on his deathbed by emperor Tenji in 669.54 According to the Tonomine 
Shrine chronicle, the Tonomine Engi by Ichiji Kaneyoshi (1402-1481), Katamari’s dying 
words were, “If you place my grave on this spot, my children and grandchildren will rise 
to high rank.”55 However, it was not until long after his death that Kamatari was deified. 
The centuries-dead Fujiwara was turned into a godhead by ex-emperor Go-Hanazono 
(1428-1464) and given the posthumous Shinto name Tōnomine Daimyōjin. Here we see 
the same name later used by the Yoshida to deify Toyotomi Hideyoshi as Hōkoku 
Daimyōjin.  
 There were two reasons that Ieyasu might have wished to emulate Kamatari. First, 
seeking to create a more centralized and authoritarian government, Kamatari initiated the 
Taika Reform. Similarly, Ieyasu had completed the task of unifying the Japanese 
archipelago creating the most powerful government in Japanese history. That the Taika 
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Reform failed to exert strong influence during Kamatari’s time is of little significance, for 
it did lay the groundwork for the centralizing Taihō and Yōrō Codes that were soon to 
follow. Ieyasu had sought to consolidate authority just as Kamatari had. Furthermore, 
Kamatari’s title as well as his status as a tutelary deity were both bestowed by emperors 
just as the title of shogun was granted to Ieyasu by emperor Go-Yōzei in 1603. Second, 
Kamatari was the progenitor of a long illustrious lineage. Kamatari’s son, Fujiwara 
Fubito (659-720) was arguably as powerful as his father and was himself father-in-law to 
two emperors and grandfather to a third.56 Fubito would sire four sons, each of whom 
would create a distinct and long lasting line of the Fujiwara clan: the Nankke Fujiwara, 
the Hokke Fujiwara, the Shikike Fujiwara, and the Kyōke Fujiwara.57 In fact, the 
Fujiwara would continue to hold stations at the very apex of government until the end of 
the Second World War. Konoye Fumimaro (1891-1945) of the Fujiwara family served as 
Prime Minister of Japan, demonstrating longevity of sustained authority that surely would 
have impressed Ieyasu.58  
 Fujiwara Kamatari had sought to unify Japan and was also the progenitor of an 
enduring family dynasty. Furthermore, after being deified as Tonomine Daimyōjin, 
Kamatari was worshiped by his descendants and viewed as the power safeguarding his 
family’s fortunes. Therefore, it was natural for emerging hegemons to utilize the model 
of Kamatari’s deification for their own benefit. Like Kamatari, Toyotomi Hideyoshi and 
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Tokugawa Ieyasu sought both to establish centralized control over the islands and to lay 
the foundation of a lasting lineage.  
 After Kamatari, the next person to be deified as a Shinto tutelary deity was 
Toyotomi Hideyoshi. Perhaps the reason that there was such a long period without the 
deification of a hegemon points to the gradual decentralization of power that began 
during the classical period (794-1185) and that characterized the medieval period (1185-
1568). Regardless of the reason, the next tutelary deity would be Ieyasu’s predecessor, 
Hideyoshi. As pointed out by Mary E. Berry, Hideyoshi was encouraged to widen his 
base of legitimacy as he had no strong heir and had been in power only for a relatively 
short period of time.59 According to the Miyudono no Ue no Nikki, by Maeda Gen’i who 
was present at Hideyoshi’s end, on his deathbed, Hideyoshi made a request to be 
enshrined next to his impressive temple, Hōkōji in Kyoto. Like Kamatari, Hideyoshi was 
granted title and deification, this time by emperor Go-Yōzei in 1598.60 The Yoshida 
Shinto rites were carried out by Bonshun and his brother, granting Hideyoshi the status of 
a tutelary deity and the name Hōkoku Daimyōjin. It should be noted that Hōkoku shrine, 
along with the adjacent Hōkoji and its giant bronze Buddha, were considered to be the 
grandest structures in Japan at the time.61  
It was only after the deification of Hideyoshi that the potential popular influence 
of such religious movements became apparent. Although it is unclear how many people 
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were worshiping at the Tōnomine shrine of Katamari, we do know that “many crowds” 
visited the Hōkoku shrine.62 Additionally, within months of the establishment of 
Hideyoshi’s shrine, branch shrines began to spring up in various provinces. One example 
of a branch shrine being erected is the Hōkoku shrine of Higo built by Katō Kiyomasa.63 
Kiyomasa was a general and veteran of Hideyoshi’s Korean campaigns. Furthermore, 
unlike the later cult of Tōshō Daigongen, the popularity of the cult surrounding Hōkoku 
Daimyōjin was not limited to Hideyoshi’s family or samurai elites. This popular 
movement was immortalized by a member of the preeminent artisan family of the day, 
Kanō Naizen (1570-1616) on the painted screen depicting the festivities surrounding the 
seventh anniversary of Hideyoshi’s death.  
 
Fig. 3, A depiction of the Toyokuni Festival. Hideo Kuroda, Hōkoku Saireizu o Yomu, Kadokawa Sensho, 
533 (Tokyo: Kabushiki Kaisha Kadokawa, 2013). 8. 
 
Naizen’s screen is revealing in that is depicts both warrior elites and commoners 
celebrating Hōkoku Daimyōjin. This stands in contrast to the later Tōshōgū cult’s elitist 
model that barred visit or worship by commoners.  
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There are distinct parallels between Katamari’s, Hideyoshi’s, and Ieyasu’s 
deifications. Each of them made a request to be enshrined and worshiped. Katamari’s 
offer of high rank to his descendants may seem less grandiose than Ieyasu’s offer to 
protect the eight provinces, but the general implication is the same: worship me and I will 
protect you. We do not have such details from Hideyoshi’s death, but, since he requested 
the title of a tutelary deity, we can assume that he sought a similar station. Through these 
three men, we can also see a shift from worship and protection of those who were strictly 
family to the inclusion of followers and vassals. Eventually, the worship of Ieyasu would 
move from veneration by family and followers to worship as a god by an entire state. The 
long span of time that passed between the deification of Katamari and that of Hideyoshi 
points to the rarity of such practices and the novel steps that the newly emerging 
hegemonic military rulers were willing to take in order to strengthen the legitimacy of 
their rule. Tōshōgū would go on to succeed where the Toyokuni movement had failed. 
The Tokugawa would continue to rule as shoguns for fifteen generations. Furthermore, 
by looking forward to 1721, we can see that the practice of venerating Tōshō Daigongen 
in the name of Tokugawa authority, protection, and peace was still being actively utilized 
by the bakufu:  
 
Kyōhō 6/9/26 
 
Yoshimune, the eighth Tokugawa shogun, had gathered the fudai daimyo. These 
hereditary lords, whose ancestors had stood with Ieyasu at the battle of Sekigahara, 
commanded the strategically vital domains that shielded Tokugawa lands from potential 
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attack from foreign invaders and tozama daimyo alike. Yoshimune was concerned that 
the fudai were becoming lax in their duties and showing weakness to the tozama lords, 
who were still bitter over their defeat at Sekigahara. The shogun needed to inspire the 
vassals assembled here before him. To do this he turned to the strongest source of bakufu 
ideology, his own ancestor, Tōshō Daigongen. He greeted the gathering by stating, “That 
I myself and all of you have met with a period of peace, in which the empire is well-
ordered, and that we live in ease, is solely due to the divine virtue of the Toshogu (sic). Is 
it not something to be grateful for?”64  
Ieyasu’s dream of becoming a tutelary deity had come true. Eight generations 
after his passing, his descendants were looking to him for strength and legitimacy. By 
looking to the past models of Fujiwara Kamatari and Toyotomi Hideyoshi, Ieyasu and his 
followers successfully built a cult of personality around the first Tokugawa shogun. Still, 
it should be clear that the agency behind the founding of Tōshōgū at Nikkō was propelled 
less by Ieyasu than it was by Tenkai. By critically examining the last will and testament 
recorded by Sūden, we can infer that Ieyasu likely did not intend to be reburied at Nikkō. 
Rather, it was Tenkai who sought to capitalize on Ieyasu’s death by taking control of the 
deified shogun’s cult. As the following chapter will show, Tenkai sought to solidify and 
strengthen his power base in the Kanto region. The Tendai priest had found a receptive 
patron in Hidetada. However, Tenkai could have had no inkling that it would be the next 
shogun, Iemitsu, who would become the most ardent benefactor to Tōshōgū.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
THE AGGRANDIZEMENT OF TŌSHŌGU 
 
 
Architecture is an expression of values. 
 – Norman Foster 
 
 
 
 
The Tōshōgū shrine is situated in the Nikkō Mountains eighty miles due north of 
Tokyo. In 1999, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) recognized the shrines and temples of Nikkō as a World Heritage Site.65 
Drawing both domestic and international crowds, Tōshōgū is the crown jewel of this 
sacred locale. The shrine has been lauded for its ingenious architecture and elaborate 
decor. Somewhat strangely, it has also occasionally been praised as being emblematic of 
Japanese artistry. While it is true that the brightly colored and intricately carved buildings 
of Tōshōgū are uniquely Japanese, and that this architectural style spread to other satellite 
Tōshōgū shrines, the elaborate and polychrome motifs, which border on the ostentatious, 
are hardly in keeping with the Zen inspired rustic simplicity which most people imagine 
to be representative of the Japanese aesthetic. However, this innovative style was in no 
way accidental. Rather, it was meant to inspire a sense of awe and otherworldliness. 
Additionally, the shrine’s unique features only came about two decades after its initial 
foundation. Although Tōshōgū was largely completed in 1617, it did not take on its 
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contemporary form until 1636.66 Iemitsu (1604-1651), the third Tokugawa shogun, 
inaugurated the reconstruction project in 1634. This chapter will explore both why and 
how Iemitsu raised the profile of Tōshōgū shrine to rival even that of the imperial shrines 
in Ise. Although Tōshōgū had already become a symbol of the Tokugawa house and an 
additional source of legitimacy for the bakufu, it was under Iemitsu’s patronage that 
Tōshōgū would become a central tool of both domestic and international legitimacy for 
the bakufu.   
Seeking to strengthen shogunal rule, Iemitsu undertook projects to aggrandize 
Tōshōgū architecturally, geographically, and ideologically. Architecturally, the third 
shogun embraced a bold new style of ornamentation wildly different from other religious 
structures of the day. Top artisans were called upon to work on the shrine in Nikkō, and 
no expense was spared. In terms of geographic aggrandizement, this religious movement 
that was centered on Tōshō Daigongen proliferated, and satellite shrines were established 
throughout the land, although most commonly in the domains either under direct bakufu 
control or in the han of the shinpan daimyo. The number of annual pilgrimages to 
Tōshōgū also increased under Iemitsu, and many daimyo and hatamoto bannermen 
accompanied the shogun on lavish processions of religious spectacle. Ideologically, 
Iemitsu sought to use the impressive architecture of Tōshōgū as a tool for political and 
social legitimacy. Iemitsu worked to restore the imperial household shrine of Ise while at 
the same time pressuring the imperial court to elevate the rank of Tōshōgū to an equal 
status.  
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Iemitsu had both practical and personal motives to develop these varied aspects of 
Tōshōgū. Pragmatically, Iemitsu was faced with the reality that he was the first 
Tokugawa shogun who had not served in battle. This meant that he was forced to rely on 
hereditary right rather than martial might for legitimacy. Furthermore, the size of the 
bakufu’s standing army was greatly reduced compared to the armies of the Sekigahara or 
Osaka Castle campaigns led by Ieyasu. These issues heightened necessity for the creation 
of an alternate form of legitimacy that did not rely on the force of arms. In this respect, 
Tenkai’s work at Nikkō had already laid the groundwork for what Iemitsu saw as the 
ultimate source of legitimacy: Tōshō Daigongen.  
Iemitsu also had a familial and religious devotion to his grandfather that drove 
Iemitsu’s focus on Tōshō Daigongen as a source of legitimacy. The third shogun owed 
his very title to Ieyasu, as the second shogun, Hidetada, had planned on passing the 
position of shogun to his older son, Tadanaga. However, Ieyasu had declared that Iemitsu 
would be the heir, securing Iemitsu’s place as the third Tokugawa shogun. Furthermore, 
Iemitsu had numerous dreams of his grandfather, which were recorded in written prayer 
offerings and paintings. In these dreams Iemitsu claimed to receive advice, be healed of 
maladies, and be forewarned of impending threats by the spirit of Ieyasu. Iemitsu even 
took to calling himself the second generation Gongen.  
After Tenkai emerged victorious from his theological struggle against the Zen 
priest Sūden and the Yoshida Shinto scion Bonshun, the Tendai priest presided over the 
ground breaking of the Tōshōgu project on the twenty-sixth day of the tenth month of 
1616. On the fifteenth of the third month of 1617, Ieyasu’s remains were exhumed from 
Kunōzan in Suruga and brought to Nikkō. Then, on the seventeenth of the fourth month, 
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precisely one year after Ieyasu’s death, Tenkai re-deified Ieyasu as Tōshō Daigongen, 
“The Great Avatar Illuminating the East.”67  
When Ieyasu’s remains were moved from Kunōzan to Nikkō, the construction of 
the shrine and temple complex was nearly complete. There was simultaneous 
construction underway on the older, neighboring religious institutions such as Rinnōji 
and Futarasan Shrine. Founded in 766, Rinnōji is a Tendai temple that was under 
Tenkai’s control and would become arguably the most powerful Tendai temple in the 
Kanto during this period. Futarasan is a Shinto shrine founded in 767 and dedicated to the 
three Kami, Ōkuninushi, Tagorihime, and Ajisukitakahikone. Managers, laborers, and 
artisans undertook this revitalization effort in order to make the area a more suitable 
location for the deified Ieyasu’s remains to rest and was completed in 1619.68 
The original Tōshōgū, which was actually called Tōshōsha as the court had yet to 
bestow the title of miya to Ieyasu’s resting place, was a large complex, consisting of a 
main sanctuary, the Hall of the Primordial Deity, numerous corridors, an offering hall, a 
stable, multi-story gate houses, treasuries, wash basins, and, of course, a tori gate. The 
construction of the main shrine utilized the rare style of ishi no ma zukuri, which has 
come to be called, gongen zukuri, after Ieyasu’s posthumous name. Translated as, “stone 
room building,” this style dates back to the medieval period and was first used in the 
construction of Sugawara Michizane’s (845-903) mausoleum. Gongen zukuri is primarily 
characterized by the linking of the main hall and worship hall by a stone floored hallway. 
                                                        
67. W. J. Boot, “The Death of a Shogun: Deification in Early Modern Japan” 
(Honolulu, HI: U of Hawaii P, 2000), 155. 
68. Naomi Ōkawa, Edo Architecture, Katsura, and Nikko, 1st English ed., 
Heibonsha Survey of Japanese Art ; v. 20 (New York: Weatherhill, 1975), 28. 
  45 
Not coincidentally, Michizane is sometimes cited as one of the first men to be 
apotheosized in Japanese history, although he was not treated as a tutelary deity, but 
rather as a vengeful spirit (onryō) who needed to be placated by means of religious 
ceremony. Nevertheless, this was the origin of the ishi no ma zukuri style of construction. 
This same style was used in the construction of Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s Toyokuni Shrine 
mausoleum in Kyoto. In fact, not only was the same style of architecture used for 
Hideyoshi’s and Ieyasu’s shrines, but many of the same builders and artisans worked on 
both sites.69 Still, despite the records describing the splendor of Hideyoshi’s Toyokuni 
Jinja and neighboring Hōkōji, all indications point to the fact that these structures, as well 
as the original Tōshōsha were nowhere nearly as ostentatious as the current Tōshōgū 
complex, which would take its current form in 1636 under Iemitsu.70 
Even before Iemitsu came of age, Tenkai was spreading his influence throughout 
the Kanto region both under the auspices of his Tendai temples as well as the Tōshō 
shrines, which operated under Tenkai’s jurisdiction. Sannō Ichijitsu Shinto, which had 
been invented by Tenkai in his bid against Sūden and Bonshun, had become the religious 
sect in charge of the deified Tōshō Daigongen, thereby cementing both Tenkai’s and the 
Tendai sect’s already strong connection to the bakufu.71 Seemingly never content with his 
political ambitions, Tenkai moved quickly after the founding of the Nikkō Tōshōgū and 
established a shrine in Edo castle. At the same time, Tenkai began the building project for 
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Kaneiji northeast of the castle in Ueno. Kaneiji was meant to be the Enryakuji of the east, 
and Tenkai’s project made clear his goal of shifting the traditional Tendai power base 
from Mount Hiei near Kyoto to the Kanto. As leader of the Tendai sect, Tenkai placed an 
imperial prince as the principal monzeki at Rinnōji in Nikkō. This placed all Tendai 
temples as well as their subordinate shrines under the auspices of the Nikkō temple and 
Tenkai.72 
Tenkai did not stop in his efforts to spread the nascent religious movement. 
Within fifteen years of the establishment of Nikkō Tōshōsha, satellite shrines began to 
appear throughout central and eastern Japan. It should be noted that, while the Tōshōgu 
shrine at Kunōzan today claims to be the first Tōshō shrine, this is highly unlikely. 
Clearly, since the first deification of Ieyasu was conducted by the Yoshida according to 
Yuiitsu Shinto, whose religious underpinnings were completely different from those of 
Tōshōgū and subsequent satellite shrines, the original shrine at Kunōzan would have been 
a Yoshida Shinto shrine. Furthermore, at the time of Ieyasu’s first deification ritual, 
Tenkai had not yet petitioned the court for the posthumous name of Tōshō Daigongen. 
Therefore, despite the claims of the current Kunōzan priests, the Tōshō Shrine in Nikkō 
was the first to bear that name.  
Although the Nikkō shrine was the first to bear the name of Tōshō Daigongen, it 
was far from the last. It is unclear when, but the Kunōzan shrine was likely the first 
satellite shrine. Because the syncretic Buddhist and Shinto practice had been well 
established by the early modern period, the notion of dividing a spirit (bunrei) and 
inviting those portioned spirits (kanjō) to reside at various satellite temples and shrines 
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was already accepted and widely practiced.73 This meant that Tenkai, or those who had 
their own reasons for establishing Tōshōsha on their own lands, needed only to gain 
permission from the bakufu to do so. This was in contrast to the initial establishment of 
the Nikkō shrine, which required the consultation of the imperial court as well as the 
bakufu. This relaxation of requirements enabled the subsequent proliferation of shrines.  
Along with Nikkō and Kunōzan, new Tōshō Shrines were founded in 1617 at 
Tenkai’s new Tendai center of Kita’in in Kawagoe as well as in the Hirosaki domain. The 
daimyo of Hirosaki, Tsugaru Nobuhira (1586-1631), had been a favored follower of 
Ieyasu, and had been excused from participating in the siege of Osaka. Ieyasu’s 
generosity may have been related to the fact that Tsugaru was married to Ieyasu’s 
adopted daughter. Either way, the debt of gratitude he felt to Ieyasu was made clear by 
this early establishment of a Tōshōsha in Hirosaki. In the following year the Tōshōsha 
inside Edo Castle was built. 1619 saw the first establishment of a shrine dedicated to 
Ieyasu in a domain of one of the shinpan daimyo. Specifically, one of the three main 
branch families of the Tokugawa, or gosanke, built a Tōshōsha in their Owari residence. 
The other two gosanke, Mito and Wakayama, built their own residence shrines in 1621.74 
In 1625, the bakufu approved the construction of the Kan’ei Tōshōsha in Ueno.75 In 1628, 
Tōdō Takatora, another of Ieyasu’s former vassals, built a shrine in the province of Iga. 
The same year also saw the erection of shrines in other religious institutions. This 
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surprising development included a small Tōshōsha in Nanzenji, indicating that Sūden had 
apparently given up his recalcitrant stance toward Tenkai’s movement. Also in 1628, the 
Kongōbunji of Koyasan erected a shrine honoring Ieyasu, with Enryakuji of Mount Hiei 
following suit in 1634.76 The new shrine at Enryakuji was built adjacent to the venerable 
Hie shrine, where the deified Ieyasu replaced Ōmiya as the protector deity of the 
birthplace of the Tendai order.77  
By examining a recently compiled catalog of Tōshōgū Shrines, a continued 
pattern of proliferation of the shrines becomes even more apparent. The All Japan 
Tōshōgū Shrine Association (Zenkoku Tōshōgū Rengōai) compiled a history of Tōshōgū 
Shrines in 1965. This work, entitled The Public Tokugawa Ieyasu (Tokugawa Ieyasu-Kō), 
contains over thirty pages of tables that catalogues all known Tōshōgū Shrines, including 
smaller altars contained within larger temple and shrine complexes. The current edition 
lists 516 shrines and subordinate shrines. This catalog is ordered geographically, with the 
tables giving the name of the shrine, its location according to current political 
demarcation, points of interest, and, when known, the date of enshrinement. Although 
most shrines claim a date of enshrinement, the Shrine Association has done a 
commendable job of listing only the dates that were verifiable. This brings the number of 
shrines with dates listed to 246. As the focus of this study is confined to the Genna (1615-
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1624) and Kan’ei (1624-1644) eras, attention will be given to the eighty-four entries 
containing both date of establishment and locale that fall between 1615 and 1644.78  
That eighty-four shrines were established in the early Edo period is not surprising, 
given the popularity of Hideyoshi’s earlier Toyokuni cult. Yet, from the onset, the cult of 
Ieyasu differed from the Toyokuni movement by catering to the warrior elite. This was in 
stark contrast to the Toyokuni cult, which was just as popular among commoners as it 
was among Hideyoshi’s samurai followers. Plotting the Shrine Association’s cataloged 
locations in chronological order on a map makes it evident that the majority of the early 
Tōshōgū shrines were established around the Tokugawa capital of Edo in the Kanto 
region, either in lands of the Tokugawa Bakufu, or the domains of their collateral houses, 
the shinpan daimyo. It is clear that the spread and propagation of the Tōshōgū shrines 
was extremely popular among the shinpan and a limited number of fudai daimyo. 
Unsurprisingly, the tozama daimyo seem to have been less interested in enshrining the 
shogun, who had defeated them at Sekigahara at the turn of the century. 
 
Iemitsu’s Impetus  
 
 While it is true that it was the second Tokugawa shogun, Hidetada, who finally 
sided with Tenkai and allowed Ieyasu to be exhumed, moved to Nikkō, and re-deified, it 
was under Hidetada’s son and third shogun, Iemitsu, that Tōshōgū would receive its 
highest level of patronage. By the end of the Kan’ei era (1644) there were eighty-four 
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Tōshōgū shrines, and by the time of Iemitsu’s death, this number had increased to over 
one hundred.79 Furthermore, by this time, festivals were being held on the anniversary of 
Ieyasu’s death at the shrines of the gosanke and at Nikkō. The differing relationships 
between Hidetada and the shrines, on the one hand, and between Iemitsu and Nikkō on 
the other, highlight not only Iemitsu’s heightened need for alternate sources of legitimacy, 
but also the two shoguns’ styles of rule. Hidetada had enjoyed a close relationship with 
his father, Ieyasu. The first two Tokugawa shoguns often enjoyed various extra-political 
activities together such as hawking, tea ceremonies, and nō plays.80 Perhaps this 
relationship is one of the reasons that Hidetada never developed a reputation for 
innovation. What his father had put in place worked, and it was in no way clear to early 
Edo period contemporaries that the stability enjoyed after the battles of Sekigahara and 
Osaka Castle was going to last. To innovate was to risk a return to the turmoil of the 
Warring States. Hidetada had seen battle not only with his father, but also with his 
advisers and the other daimyo. This experience lent a certain amount of legitimacy to 
Hidetada in the eyes of the warrior class. To be clear, Hidetada’s lack of innovation is not 
brought to light here as a slight, but rather to highlight his differences to the innovative 
Iemitsu. All indications point to Hidetada being an agreeable, honest, and upstanding 
ruler. Ieyasu even admonished Hidetada not to be so upright, to which Hidetada reputedly 
replied, “When a man such as father tells a lie, people will believe him. But when 
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someone like myself, with no particular attainments, tries to lie, there are no takers.81” 
Nevertheless, although Hidetada could not match the personal charisma and influence of 
his father, Iemitsu initially commanded even less respect.  
 Furthermore, Iemitsu did not enjoy the same fatherly bond with Hidetada that had 
existed between the first two shoguns. Iemitsu had been sickly as a child, and Hidetada 
had initially decided to appoint Iemitsu’s younger brother, Tadanaga as third shogun.82 
Fortunately for Iemitsu, Ieyasu intervened. Ieyasu seemed to have a fondness for the  frail 
Iemitsu, and declared from his position as ōgosho that Iemitsu would succeed Hidetada as 
shogun.83 It was rumored that it was Iemitsu’s wet nurse, Lady Kasuga no Tsubome, who 
had found the ear of Ieyasu and convinced him of Iemitsu’s merit.84 Still, despite the 
machinations of Lady Kasuga and beneficence of Ieyasu, the precedent that his 
grandfather had set by ruling as ōgosho after abdicating the office of shogun 
inconvenienced Iemitsu. Hidetada, like his father before him, established himself as 
ōgosho and was the de facto ruler of the bakufu until his death. In fact, while Ieyasu had 
gone to great pains to slowly shift power to Hidetada in order to ensure a smooth 
transition of rule, Hidetada made no such effort, leaving Iemitsu with an uncooperative 
and unimpressed group of senior advisers. Therefore, despite assuming the title of shogun 
in 1623, Iemitsu would have to wait for his father’s death in 1632 before taking the reins 
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of government. It was from this time forward that Iemitsu began to implement his 
innovative approaches to governance.85 
 Even after Hidetada’s death, Iemitsu was forced to find a way to weaken the roles 
of his father’s former councilors, who Iemitsu had inherited. He did this by creating a 
new bakufu office titled the rokuninshū, or the council of six. These men were hand 
selected by Iemitsu and slowly elevated in rank until they displaced Hidetada’s old guard. 
Iemitsu forced the last of Hidetada’s remaining advisors, Doi Toshikatsu and Sakai 
Tadakatsu, into unofficial retirement in 1638.86  
 These changes to the composition of the upper echelons of the bakufu were 
carried out simultaneously with more direct policy adjustments such as the 
implementation of maritime restrictions (kaikin) and a more cooperative relationship with 
the imperial court in Kyoto.87 Iemitsu also codified the alternate attendance system 
(sankin kōtai) by amending the codes for warrior houses (buke shohatto) in 1635. 
Iemitsu’s reign also saw the introduction of the bakufu inspectors who would monitor 
both the remaining councilors loyal to Hidetada (ōmetsuke) and the daimyo (junkenshi).88 
Iemitsu also used less conventional means to secure his position and authority. Iemitsu 
accused his younger brother of treason and pressured him to commit suicide.89 All of 
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these measures illustrate the innovative nature of Iemitsu’s rule. But, it was not simply 
the remnants of his father’s staff that drove Iemitsu’s novel policies.  
 In addition to an early cadre of advisers who were recalcitrant to innovation, 
Iemitsu had to contend with a dearth of military reputation. Unlike his grandfather and 
father, the third shogun had never been tested in battle. In an age when many of the 
daimyo and bannermen of the bakufu had fought at Osaka, if not also at Sekigahara, 
Iemitsu was a warrior in name only. This lack of reputation was one of the factors that 
encouraged Iemitsu to aggrandize his grandfather’s religious movement in order to 
strengthen the Tokugawa name.  
 Iemitsu did not need to fear his lack of martial reputation with the tozama, as he 
could still utilize the might of coalition just as his grandfather had to defeat the Toyotomi 
loyalists. Iemitsu did, however, worry about impressing the collateral houses and other 
nominally subordinate military houses of the fudai daimyo upon whom Iemitsu relied to 
muster troops should the need arise. This was because the bakufu’s own forces were in 
reality a glorified police force, and not comprised of numbers adequate to carry out large-
scale campaigns.90 Still, Iemitsu cleverly addressed both of these issues at the same time. 
Upon hearing that the collateral branch of Owari was considering revolt,  Iemitsu utilized 
the ascendance of his niece as empress as an opportunity to assemble an army 309,000 
strong and march to Kyoto. On the way, Iemitsu and his coalition army stopped in Owari 
as a way of showing Iemitsu’s uncle that the office of the shogun was as strong as ever.91  
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 Still, even as Iemitsu was demonstrating his skill as a policy maker, his ability to 
form coalitions, and his desire to improve relations at court, he still sought to strengthen 
his rule with a form of legitimacy unavailable to the daimyo. As demonstrated, Iemitsu 
was an innovator. Therefore, it is not surprising that he also sought to expand upon the 
bakufu’s religious source of ideological authority: Tōshōgū. This was made easy thanks 
to the groundwork laid by Tenkai and other supporters of the religious movement. 
Having shrines already established throughout the land meant that Tōshō Daigongen was 
the perfect tool to strengthen Iemitsu’s standing among those he depended on for 
coalition. But Iemitsu had more than practical reasons to build up the Nikkō movement.  
 Of all the Tokugawa shoguns, Iemitsu’s adoration of Ieyasu was unmatched. It is 
clear that he owed his rule to Ieyasu, and this was likely the primary source of his 
veneration. This reverence was further fueled by a number of dreams concerning his 
deified grandfather in the last decade of Iemitsu’s life. Although these divine dreams, or 
reimu, occurred after most of Iemitsu’s Tōshōgū related projects were completed, they 
still present a clear indication of the reverence that he had for Ieyasu.92  
There is a long tradition in East Asia of interpreting dreams as communication 
with the gods and the spirits of the deceased. While there are countless examples in 
religious and historical texts, the two following examples are of particular relevance. The 
first prominent case is Confucius’ complaints over no longer seeing the spirit of the Duke 
of Zhou. Interestingly, this was a lamentation of the state of government, indicating that 
divine dreams not only had a long history in East Asia, but that these divine dreams could 
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also often contain political rhetoric. As Gerhart points out, divine dreams in Japan date as 
far back as the earliest indigenous written records. “In [the] Kojiki古事記 (712) and [the] 
Nihon shoki 日本書紀 (720), for example, dreams provide instructions from the gods to 
the early emperors, forewarning them of danger, explaining mysterious events, 
encouraging the building of worship halls and the performance of rites, and offering 
advice on keeping peace and waging war.93” Ieyasu’s deified persona, Tōshō Daigongen, 
appeared to Iemitsu in at least thirteen dreams between 1629 and 1647.  These dreams 
were considered to be divine intervention in response to Iemitsu’s bouts of illness, to 
ritual events concerning Nikkō Tōshōgu, and to the illness and death of important figures 
in Iemitsu’s life, such as Tenkai.94 Iemitsu had these dreams recorded as holy paintings 
by the famed artist, Kano Tan’yu. These paintings are still extant, although they are 
rarely displayed.95 
 Not all of these dreams were documented in paintings. Additional reimu were 
recorded on Shinto prayer slips known as norito. These prayers were written and recited 
by Iemitsu’s wet nurse, Katsuga no Tsubone (1579-1643).96 This additional evidence of 
Iemitsu’s veneration of his grandfather was uncovered in 1922 at Tenkai’s Rinnōji in 
Nikkō. Staff found seven protection amulet pouches, or mamori bukuro, which contained 
slips of paper thought to have been penned by Iemitsu himself. Among the inscriptions 
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were the phrases, “second generation avatar,” and, “second generation shogun.”97 Not 
only does this support the notion of Iemitsu’s close personal and spiritual connection with 
Ieyasu, but it also highlights the tensions he experienced with his own father, who had 
sought to pass the title of shogun to Iemitsu’s brother. Not only did Iemitsu have his 
father, Hidetada, entombed in Edo instead of Nikkō, but from the prayer slips in which 
Iemitsu refers to himself as the “second generation shogun,” we can infer that Iemitsu 
was writing his own father out of the Tokugawa lineage. These norito also raise some 
interesting questions about Iemitsu’s beliefs in reincarnation. For example, historian 
Sonehara Satoshi posits that the slips indicate that Iemitsu believed in the second coming 
of Ieyasu, which in turn suggests that Iemitsu believed that he was the reincarnation of 
his grandfather.98 This assertion seems odd given the fact that Iemitsu was born well 
before his grandfather’s death. Still, as demonstrated in the first chapter, this was a time 
of great theological fluidity. 
 
A New Nikkō 
 
 In 1636 Iemitsu held a massive festival at the Nikkō Tōshōsha on the twentieth 
anniversary of his grandfather’s apotheosis. This marked the near completion of the most 
expensive construction project undertaken in the first half of the Seventeenth Century.99 
The project was the culmination of efforts by both Tenkai and Iemitsu, although Iemitsu 
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deserves the lion’s share of recognition. For Tenkai, Iemitsu’s physical aggrandizement 
of Nikkō Tōshōsha was the culmination of the plan set in motion under Hidetada 
surrounding Ieyasu’s death that would establish Tenkai’s supremacy as religious head 
Eastern Japan. For Iemitsu, however, the material improvements to the shrine were part 
of an even larger campaign. Driven by both insecurities regarding the Tokugawa branch 
families and other daimyo, as well as a personal devotion to his deified grandfather, 
Iemitsu likely saw the newly rebuilt shrine as a tool that would further strengthen his 
reign and the Tokugawa mainline legacy.  
 Iemitsu had first experimented with architecture as a tool for legitimacy with his 
completion of Nijō Castle in Kyoto, a project Ieyasu had inaugurated with the intent that 
it be the base of operations for the Tokugawa in the imperial capital. The architectural 
enhancement of this castle under Iemitsu not only employed grand style, but also towered 
over the imperial palace, which made clear Iemitsu’s position as chief military authority 
of the land and was an obvious display of intimidation.100 Historian Morgan Pitelka 
convincingly argues that this early success of “architecture-as-politics101” likely 
encouraged Iemitsu’s 1632 project, Hidetada’s mausoleum. The Taitokuin, located in 
Edo near Zōjōji and which housed the remains of the second shogun, further established 
the precedent for the opulent style of Tōshōgū in Nikkō. Of particular relevance is the 
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ornate gate leading to the primary worship hall. Nikkō, too, is arguably most famous for 
its elaborately decorated Yōmeimon gate.102 
 The reconstruction of the originally more subdued Nikkō Tōshōsha, perhaps 
lacking the grandeur Iemitsu required for his ideological plans, began in the eleventh 
month of 1634.103 The project was completed in a year and a half, although minor 
construction and finishing work continued until 1643.104 In order to accommodate the 
scope of the project, Iemitsu granted Tenkai increased landholdings for the Nikkō 
shrine.105 Iemitsu must have been pleased with his earlier building projects, as he laid out 
an impressive amount of resources to complete the project. All told, the third shogun 
spent 568,000 ryō gold coins, 100 kanme silver pieces, and 1,000 koku of rice.106 This 
lavish expenditure amounted to one seventh of the entire bakufu treasury, which had been 
left well-endowed by Ieyasu, the spendthrift Hidetada, and the still producing gold and 
silver mines under Tokugawa control.107 In terms of manpower, the project required 1.69 
million man-days by carpenters, 2.83 million man-days by porters, and 23,000 man-days 
by appliers of gold leaf.108 The Governor of Tajima, Akimoto Yasutomo, supervised this 
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massive project. The master builder and artisan supervisor was Kora Munehiro, Governor 
of Bungo. In charge of all interior and exterior painting was Kanō Tan’yu.109  
 Kanō Tan’yu was the preeminent artist of his day. The fact that Iemitsu would 
hire him  not only reflected the prestige of both Tan’yu and his family, but also illustrated 
the importance that Iemitsu placed in the reconstruction project at Nikkō. The Kanō 
family came to fame as the leading artists under the rule of Oda Nobunaga. Kanō Eitoku 
(1543-1590) crafted a pair of gold leaf screens in 1574, which were purchased by 
Nobunaga and given to Uesugi Kenshin (1530-1578).110 Then, in 1576, Nobunaga 
appointed Eitoku to paint the entire interior of the soaring Azuchi Castle. From this point 
onward, the Kanō name was associated with the hegemons of Japan, and Eitoku became 
the most renowned painter in the country.111 After Nobunaga’s assassination and 
Hideyoshi’s rise to power, Eitoku was invited again to decorate the hegemon’s two 
palaces: Jurakudai in Kyoto and Osaka Castle. Eitoku painted the interiors of both. 
Another of the Kanō family, Nanzen, would go on to paint the double gold leaf screens 
depicting the Toyokuni matsuri which was presented in the previous chapter. Eitoku’s 
son, Mitsunobu (1561-1608) also served Hideyoshi, but began to branch out, working on 
commission for a number of daimyo, including Tokugawa Ieyasu. It was Mitsunobu’s 
son, Takanobu (1571-1618) who brought his own son, the nine-year-old Tan’yu, to an 
audience with Ieyasu in 1611. At this meeting, Tan’yu painted a picture of a cat with a 
chokeberry plant. Tan’yu apparently performed so skillfully that he was acclaimed to be 
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the reincarnation of his grandfather, Eitoku.112 One is impelled to wonder if this 
grandfatherly connection made Tan’yu an especially enticing choice for Iemitsu, who 
himself seemed to have notions of being somehow a reincarnation of his grandfather. 
 Regarding the opulent style of the reconstructed shrine, Professor of Architecture, 
Okawa Naomi, posits that the “the decision to refurbish the shrine may also have been 
motivated by the amazing progress and innovation in architectural design and 
construction techniques that occurred between 1619 and 1634…Without these 
developments, there would have been no apparent reason to alter so drastically the overall 
design of the shrine such a short time after the original construction was completed.”113 
However, this statement ignores the fact that Iemitsu had first implemented this 
decorative style with his father’s mausoleum at Taitokuin. As the following will show, 
the grandeur of the new Nikkō represented the culmination of Iemitsu’s use of 
architecture and art as political power. It is also important to note that other architectural 
projects not under the purview of Iemitsu did not share Nikkō’s flamboyant stylistic 
elements. For example, the Shoin complex of Katsura, which was built more or less 
contemporaneously with Nikkō, shows none of the flamboyance or daring of Tōshōgū’s 
design. Rather, the Katsura complex is comprised of muted browns and white plastered 
walls, presented simply with exclusively straight line construction.114 
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 Indeed, the post 1636 shrine is a sight to behold. The inner and outer walls, eaves, 
and rooflines of Tōshōgū were decorated with brightly painted images carved in relief. 
There are more than five thousand Buddhist, Shinto, Confucian, and Daoist symbols, as 
well as animals and plants, adorning the shrine. Chinese lions, dragons, phoenixes, 
hawks, peonies, and chrysanthemums are just some of the more common figures carved, 
painted, and adorning the shrine complex. No part of the Tōshō shrine is as impressively 
detailed as the Yōmeimon Gate. As Karen Gerhart states, “As the public face of 
Tōshōgū’s sacred worship area, the Yōmeimon is singularly important as a focal point of 
Tokugawa efforts to create divine authority and as a rare display of such efforts for the 
edification of the general public.115” One of the reasons that Iemitsu put such attention 
and effort into the Yōmeimon gate was because only the Tokugawa, loyal daimyo, and 
the bakufu’s bannermen were allowed to enter the shrine precincts. This meant that 
commoners were unable to witness most of the shrine’s splendor. Still, the Yōmeimon 
gate is such a spectacle to behold, it certainly would have projected divinity, power, and 
authority to commoners who came to attend festivals or observe shogunal pilgrimages.  
 The scheduling of the rebuilding of Ieyasu’s shrine was also carefully calculated. 
Iemitsu timed the rebuilding of Tōshōgū to coincide with the twentieth anniversary of 
Ieyasu’s apotheosis. This date was punctuated by a massive celebration in honor and 
praise of the deified first Tokugawa shogun. By not only remodeling, but actually 
dismantling the previous structures and largely building anew, Iemitsu was creating a 
purposeful corollary to Ise shrine, which is customarily dismantled, burned, and rebuilt 
every two decades. This ritualized renewal did not become tradition for Tōshōgū, as there 
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were some significant logistical and theological differences. First of all, while Ise shrine 
was seen as the family shrine of the emperor, there were no actual remains or mausoleum 
in the shrine precinct. Secondly, the sheer cost of the reconstruction at Nikkō made future 
dismantling and destruction untenable.  
Still, Iemitsu was keen to aggrandize the status of Tōshōgū to become equal, if 
not superior, to the emperor’s Ise shrine.116 This desire to make Tōshōgū the bakufu’s 
equivalent to the imperial court’s Ise Shrine is not only evidenced by the timing of the 
rebuilding of the Nikkō shrine, but, as will be explained in the following, also by 
Iemitsu’s insistence that his grandfather’s shrine be elevated to an equal status as Ise.   
 
Shogunal Pilgrimage  
  
 Just as the utilization of religious systems for political legitimacy had a long 
tradition on the Japanese archipelago, so too, did religious pilgrimage by the social elite. 
In the Heian period, imperial pilgrimages to the Ise shrines were common, although this 
practice—as well as any active connection between the imperial court and Ise—had died 
out by the early Edo period. Prior to the weakening of the court that had occurred during 
the Ashikaga (1336-1467) and Sengoku (1467-1600) periods, the imperial family had 
utilized the shrines at Ise to reinforce the emperor’s legitimacy. By claiming direct 
descent from the Sun Goddess, Amaterasu, the imperial family retained the exclusive 
right to succession. One of the ways that those outside of the court were reminded of this 
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source of legitimacy was through imperial processions and the sending of imperial 
emissaries to the Ise shrines.  
Drawing from this abandoned tradition of pilgrimage, Hidetada led a procession 
from Edo to Nikkō to worship his deified father, Ieyasu. This established a custom of 
shogunal pilgrimage to Tōshōgū that would endure throughout the Tokugawa period. 
Hidetada’s early pilgrimages took place on the first and seventh death anniversaries of 
the first Tokugawa shogun. According to the Tokugawa Jikki, Hidetada also pilgrimaged 
between these two anniversaries in 1619, although there is no other source verifying this 
visit. Predictably, Iemitsu took the shogunal pilgrimages to Nikkō, called Nikkō no 
shogun shasan, to new heights. Not only did the shogunal processions become larger, and 
thus another of Iemitsu’s projections of authority similar to his architectural projects, but 
the costly trips to Nikkō also became more common. If the pilgrimages mentioned in the 
Tokugawa Jikki are included, Hidetada led three processions, while Iemitsu led nine.117 
Even the daimyo were on occasion required to visit Tōshōgū from time to time in a 
display of submission to the bakuhan hierarchy.118  
  
Visit 
Lunar 
Year 
Year Shogun 
Death 
Anniver-
sary 
Remarks 
1 Genna 3 1617 Hidetada Ieyasu’s 1st  - 
- Genna 5 1619 Hidetada - 
Recorded in the 
Tokugawa Jikki but 
unverified. 
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2 Genna 8 1622 Hidetada Ieyasu’s 7th  - 
- Genna 9 1623 Iemitsu - 
Recorded in the 
Tokugawa Jikki but 
unverified. 
3 Kan’ei 2 1625 Iemitsu - 
Four month delay due 
to eye disease. 
4 Kan’ei 5 1628 Iemitsu 
Ieyasu’s 
13th  
Ōgosho also 
pilgrimages 
(separately). 
5 Kan’ei 6 1629 Iemitsu - 
Prayers to heal 
Iemitsu’s smallpox. 
6 Kan’ei 9 1632 Iemitsu 
Ieyasu’s 
17th  
As Iemitsu was 
mourning Hidetada’s 
death, daimyo Ii 
Naotaka pilgrimages. 
7 Kan’ei 11 1634 Iemitsu - - 
8 Kan’ei 13 1636 Iemitsu 
Ieyasu’s 
21st  
Tōshōsha’s Grand 
Rebuilding. 
9 Kan’ei 17 1640 Iemitsu 
Ieyasu’s 
25th  
- 
10 Kan’ei 19 1642 Iemitsu - 
Construction of 
pagoda. 
11 Keian 1 1648 Iemitsu 
Ieyasu’s 
33rd  
- 
 
 Shogunal pilgrimages not only drew on imperial traditions, they also coopted 
imperial legitimacy and raised the prestige of the Tokugawa vis-à-vis the court. In 1645, 
with Tenkai acting as envoy between the imperial court and the bakufu, Iemitsu pressured 
the court to elevate the official status of Tōshōgū to that of miya, a rank held by only 
eleven other shrines, including the Ise shrines. The same year, the court also sent imperial 
offerings, or hōhei, to Tōshōgū.119 Prior to this, the Nikkō shrine had actually been 
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refered to as Tōshōsha, but henceforth would be called Tōshōgū, with “gū” being the 
Chinese reading of the character, “miya.”  
 The following year, with the aid of Iemitsu’s patronage, the imperial court 
resumed the tradition of sending imperial emisarries, or reiheishi, to Ise.120 There was one 
condition: the imperial court would also begin sending gift bearing reiheishi to 
Tōshōgū.121 In requiring this, Iemitsu was compelling the court to reinforce the public 
recognition of Tōshōgū as being equal to the Ise shrines. Furthermore, in order to to 
freeze this new hierarchy that placed the bakufu on equal footing with the imperial court, 
Iemitsu decreed that bakufu permission must be granted before imperial deification titles 
such as Daimyōjin or Tōshō Daigongen could be granted by the court.122  
 By drawing on imperial tradition, Hidetada and Iemitsu used Tōshōgū to elevate 
the politico-religious legitimacy of the Tokugawa. In fact, since tutelary titles could only 
be granted with bakufu permission, and the court depended on the bakufu to fund 
imperial emisarries, the bakufu was not only drawing on imperial tradition, it was 
usurping it.  
 Under Iemitsu, Tōshōgū was aggrandized architecturally, geographically, and 
ideologically. The grand rebuilding of the central Nikkō shrine was the largest and most 
expensive construction project of the first half of the Seventeenth Century, indicating the 
importance placed on the shrine by Iemitsu. The geographic proliferation of satellite 
shrines illustrates the successful spread of Tōshōgū as a source of ideological legitimacy 
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for the bakufu, at least among the Tokugawa, fudai daimyo, and shinpan daimyo domains. 
Finally, the elevation of Tōshōgū to miya, as well as the establishment of regular 
reiheishi visits to Nikkō, highlights Iemitsu’s ingenuity in seeking to strengthen 
Tokugawa legitimacy through Tōshōgū.  
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CHAPTER IV 
THE DYNAMIC UTILIZATION OF TŌSHŌGŪ 
 
Those who say religion has nothing to do with politics 
 do not know what religion is. 
—Mahatma Gandhi 
 
 
 After the passing of Hidetada in 1632, Iemitsu came to power and embraced 
religious ideology with exuberance bordering on the fanatical. The Nikkō shrine, 
originally founded and propelled as a movement though the agency of Tenkai, had 
become Iemitsu’s central project, costing more than any other single expenditure during 
his reign. Still, Nikkō was far north of Edo, and even farther from Kyoto. For people to 
be awed by its splendor, they would first have to visit the shrine. In this way, Tōshōgū 
can be viewed as a latent vehicle for the propagation of politico-religious ideology—
people were required to take action in order for Tōshōgū to serve its ideological function. 
For, if no one visited the shrine, it could not project Ieyasu’s divinity or Tokugawa 
prestige. Perhaps realizing that such a massive expenditure by the bakufu should be 
utilized more dynamically, Iemitsu found additional ways to strengthen Tokugawa 
legitimacy with the shrine. 
 The following will explore two ways in which Iemitsu utilized Tōshōgū as an 
active vehicle for the dynamic propagation of politico-religious ideology. That is to say, 
Iemitsu found ways to use his deified grandfather and the shrine at Nikkō to elevate the 
prestige of the Tokugawa in the eyes of the imperial court, other warriors, commoners, 
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and foreign dignitaries in a proactive, rather than passive, manner. First, Iemitsu 
pressured the Korean imperial court to pilgrimage to Nikkō in grand processions along 
the most well-traveled roadways in Japan. The shogun also coerced the Korean court to 
create and deliver politico-religious artifacts to Nikkō in order to venerate the deified 
Ieyasu and raise the status of the Tokugawa in the eyes of both the elites and commoners 
of Japan. The second way in which Iemitsu used Nikkō as an active vehicle to strengthen 
legitimacy involved the imperial court in Kyoto. Iemitsu would use gifts and threats to 
strong-arm the court into participating in the production of the Tōshō Daigongen Engi, a 
series of documents that became the official history of the early Tokugawa. The religious 
and political history presented in the scroll rewrote the Tokugawa history and gave 
imperial sanction to the claims that the Tokugawa alone were the protectors of the court 
and the rulers of Japan.  
 
The Korean Embassies 
 
Well before 1634, when Iemitsu ordered the rebuilding of the Nikkō shrine, 
the cult of Hideyoshi had been suppressed. Why then, did Iemitsu continue to pour 
resources into Tenkai’s shrine? Clearly, the shrine was a sight to behold for any who 
made the trek north from Edo, but this was an out of the way locale that most would 
never see. And, while there were many satellite shrines, they were not so numerous 
that they ever became part of daily life for ordinary Japanese. In fact, Iemitsu and 
Tenkai had other plans for Tōshōgū. In addition to domestic legitimacy, Iemitsu 
sought international legitimacy, or, to borrow a term from historian Ronald Toby, at 
  69 
least strengthened domestic legitimacy found through an international lens. Richard 
Cocks, an English trader provided this surprisingly accurate premonition in 1617: 
 
“Yt is said the Coreans sent a pr’esnt to themperour (Hidetada) . . ., 
and made their case knowne wherefore they were sent from the King 
of Corea to hym; w’ch was, first to vizet the sepulcure, or doe funeral 
rights to the deceased Emperour Ōgosho Samma (Tokugawa Ieyasu), 
and next toe reioyce w’ his Matie that now is in that he had soe quietly 
succeaded his father w’thout wars or bloodshed, and lastely to desire 
his Matie to haue the Coreans vunder his protection as his father had 
before hym, & to defend them against forraine envations, yf any other 
nation did seeke to disturbe their quiet, &c.”123 
 
In other words, the Koreans were already sending out overtures seeking to restore 
relations after the destruction wrought by Hideyoshi’s invasions of Korea. While it is 
true that Ieyasu and Hidetada worked diligently to repair the relationship with 
Korea that had been so horribly damaged by Hideyoshi’s multiple invasions, it was 
not until 1636 that Iemitsu was finally able to utilize Nikkō for his international 
diplomatic maneuverings. The idea of marching Korean ambassadors along the 
Tōkaidō highway, from Kyoto to Edo, and then up to Nikkō to pay respect to the 
founder of the Tokugawa bakufu was surely something long on Iemitsu’s mind. By 
parading the foreign elites before the Kyoto court, warriors, and commoners, the 
bakufu would appear to be powerful not only domestically, but abroad as well. 
Furthermore, although Tenkai claimed that the 1636 embassy was “moved by the 
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power of their own faith,”124 Ronald Toby paints a surely more accurate picture 
when he states that, “The Korean embassy of 1636-1637 was bullied into a 
pilgrimage to Ieyasu’s tomb at Nikko…making the trek in the midst of a heavy 
blizzard.”125 Still, Iemitsu was successful in pressuring a two-hundred and fourteen 
man delegation into traveling to Nikkō to lend legitimacy to Tokugawa rule. This 
must have delighted the third shogun, as he had Korean embassies endure the same 
journey again in 1643 and 1655, and also had a Ryukyuan delegation pay their 
respects to the Daigongen at Nikkō in 1644.126  
 Not merely content to have delegations visit Nikkō, Iemitsu enjoined the king 
of Korea to inscribe a placard for the Yōmei gate of Tōshōgū which states, “The Hall 
of Religious Practices in Nikko Calms the World and Illumines Filial Piety.”127 In the 
same year, Iemitsu provided bronze and threats through the Sō clan of Tsushima, 
the traditional intermediaries between Korea and Japan, in order to convince the 
Korean court to cast a massive bronze Dharma Bell that would be inscribed by the 
second minister of the board of rites. The Koreans acquiesced, and a Korean 
embassy of four-hundred and twenty-six delegates traveled from Korea to Nikkō to 
dedicate the bell at the Yōmei gate. The purpose of these embassies becomes even 
clearer with the reading of the Naidaijin, Kūjo Michifusa’s record of the event: “Has 
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the shogun’s military might already reached to foreign countries!?”128 Iemitsu’s 
desired effect had even reached the imperial court in Kyoto. By coercing the Koreans 
to travel along the heavily populated roads of Edo Japan, Iemitsu elevated the 
perceived international prestige of the bakufu in the eyes of the warriors, the court, 
and even the common people, who were able to observe the Korean procession on 
its way to worship at Nikkō.  
Fig. 4, A depiction of the Korean embassy delivering the Dharma Bell from the 1640 engi scroll. 
Shigemi Komatsu and Mitsuharu Kanzaki, Tōshōsha Engi (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1994), 114. 
 
The Dharma Bell was delivered and installed, and the Koreans made to pay 
homage to the Daigongen yet again. Now, in addition to the sign inscribed by the 
king of Korea himself, all of the daimyo required by bakufu decree to visit Tōshōgū 
would now pass the main Yōmei gate and see the inscription on this bell which 
reads: 
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The hall of religious practice at Nikko was constructed for the Great 
Avatar Tōshō [Ieyasu]. The Great Avatar was possessed of infinite 
merit and virtue; he receives infinite reverence. … The filial piety 
inherent in succeeding to his work and expanding thereupon 
increasingly glorifies the illustrious deeds of this ancestor. Our King 
has heard of this and, overjoyed, has caused this Dharma Bell to be 
cast in order to offer it as a supplement to the Three Treasures at his 
sepulcher…129 
 
 Iemitsu’s coercion of foreign embassies, as well as his requests for politico-
religious artifacts, indicated an evolution to a far more dynamic utilization of Tōshōgū 
than previously witnessed. Rather than pilgrimaging to the sacred site himself, the shogun 
had begun to coerce others to visit and worship Ieyasu. This more dynamic utilization of 
Tōshōgū highlights Iemitsu’s propensity for innovation. As seen in the words of the 
Dainaijin, the Kyoto aristocracy was also impressed, for perceived Tokugawa supremacy 
over a foreign court surely elevated the imperial court in Kyoto. Be that as it may, 
Iemitsu had designs on the Kyoto nobles as well.  
 
Tōshōgū and the Imperial Court 
 
 The imperial court in Kyoto and the warrior class enjoyed a long and complicated 
relationship. The court had suffered alongside the rest of Japan during the warring states 
period and had lost political power, lands, and wealth. Under the period of unification 
                                                        
129. Ibid. 101. 
  73 
(1568-1615), the hegemons, Nobunaga and Hideyoshi, had improved life for the courtiers 
significantly—especially Hideoyoshi, who embraced court culture with zeal as a way to 
erase his humble origins. Nobunaga and Hideyoshi returned lands to the court, rebuilt 
palaces, and granted stipends. But nothing is free. In return for their favors, the warriors 
expected titles and subservience. In other words, the hegemons bribed the court to 
provide non-violent sources of legitimacy.  
 The courtiers did additionally provide perceived practical aid to the warriors. 
Divination and other forms of magic were practiced to aid warriors in battle, and some of 
the most famous diviners were courtiers who had trained at the Ashikaga Gakkō in the 
Kanto region. This school was well known for producing battlefield mages, and the 
unifiers utilized the courtier diviners often.  
  Just as the Tokugawa continued many of the traditions of the preceding unifiers, 
the bakufu continued to act as the sole benefactors to the court in exchange for ranks, 
titles, and legitimacy. Additionally, the early Tokugawa shoguns continued to utilize the 
courtiers as diviners. For example, the Tsuchimikado family, experts in the art of 
divination called migatame, performed magical rites for the Tokugawa hereto reserved 
for the emperor.130 Migatame was an annual rite meant to provide health and strength to 
important men. Tsuchimikado Hisanaga also served Hidetada by using divination to 
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select the best days to move Ieyasu’s shintai, or divine body, during the move from 
Kunōzan to Nikkō in 1617.131  
Despite the continuation of patronage to the court, however, the Tokugawa also 
moved in various ways to restrain the court and assert dominance in political and 
religious spheres. Indeed, the Tokugawa worked to invert the classical relationship 
between warriors and the court. Traditionally, warriors would call on the emperor at 
court, which was seen to be a sacred and private space. Continuing the tradition that 
Hideyoshi had begun with events such as his Juraku-tei tea party, the Tokugawa forced 
the court to come to them. By having the emperor visit the shogun at places such as Nijō 
castle, the bakufu was publicly displaying superiority over the court.132 There were also a 
number of specific incidences in the early years of the Tokugawa bakufu that set the tenor 
for the rest of the Edo period. Before examining Iemitsu’s utilization of the emperor and 
courtiers with the Tōshōgū engi project, it is necessary to examine the deterioration of 
bakufu-court relations prior to Iemitsu’s tenure.  
The beginnings of troubled relations between the imperial court and the bakufu 
can be traced back to 1609. The ambitious emperor, Go-Yōzei, who felt that there had 
been progress made towards a more potent court during the unification years, discovered 
that his consort was having an affair. With minimal investigation, Go-Yōzei discovered 
that it was actually a series of affairs that included multiple consorts who had been 
carrying on trysts with popular, but low level, courtiers. This enraged Go-Yōzei, who 
demanded that Ieyasu sanction the execution of all involved. Ieyasu refused, preferring 
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that only two of the perpetrators be executed and that the rest be exiled. Ieyasu’s refusal 
to comply with Go-Yōzei’s request soured their relationship and apparently emboldened 
the emperor.  
The court lady scandal provided the impetus Go-Yōzei needed to hatch his plan 
for a strengthening of the imperial court by means of resuscitating the retired emperor 
system. This system, which had been in place during the Classical period and at the 
height of imperial power, had actually be the inspiration for Ieyasu’s position of ōgosho. 
In essence, by retiring, the sitting emperor would cloister himself while controlling the 
court—and presumably more. According to historian Lee Butler, this was exactly what 
Go-Yōzei had in mind when he requested abdication in 1610.133 
But abdication was no simple matter. By the Edo period, the court was entirely 
reliant on the bakufu for monetary support. Abdication itself did not require a major 
investment, but the investiture of a new emperor did. Therefore, Go-Yōzei was at the 
mercy of Ieyasu’s discretion. Initially, Ieyasu seems to have been willing to support Go-
Yōzei’s retirement, but the sudden death of the ōgosho’s four-year-old daughter put him 
in a foul mood. As Ieyasu delayed, Go-Yōzei pressed. This irritated Ieyasu, who 
maneuvered to allow Go-Yōzei’s abdication, but without the building of a palace, which 
Go-Yōzei saw as a requirement if he were to have any chance of a return to the cloistered 
emperor system. These events further raised tensions between the court and bakufu, 
although again, the bakufu came out on top.  
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Ieyasu, clearly unconcerned by the potential of upsetting the court, issued 
unprecedented regulations for the court in 1613 and again in 1615. The most telling 
clauses from the 1613 regulations are: 
 
[1] Courtiers are to pursue their family studies day and night without negligence. 
 
[4] Whether night or day, it is prohibited to loiter about back alleys and other 
places where one has no business.  
 
[5] Those who…associate with vulgar attendants [aosamurai] and the like will be 
punished.134 
 
Ieyasu and Hidetada were taking steps to remove the court from politics and replace it 
with the warrior class. By insisting that courtiers focus on their cultural pursuits, avoid 
skulking about where one might be tempted to participate in intrigue or insurrection, and 
by forbidding association with warriors, the bakufu was further strengthening control 
over the court by preventing subversive machinations. The 1615 regulations, known as 
the Kinchū Narabi ni Kuge Shohatto, echoed the 1613 regulations, but expanded them 
and even more drastically separated warriors from court society:  
 
[7] Appointments of warriors (buke) in functions and ranks of the imperial 
bureaucracy must be considered separate from those of the court aristocrats who 
are actually fulfilling such positions.135 
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While there were certainly contentious relations between the court and the bakufu 
under Ieyasu, the ōgosho was generally level headed and magnanimous. The agency 
behind the most heated exchanges lay with the emperor, and Ieyasu worked to keep all 
sides happy. This cannot be said for Ieyasu’s successor, Hidetada. The second shogun 
had a number of reasons to be less gentle with the court. Unlike Ieyasu, who had spent 
the majority of his time as shogun in Kyoto rather than Edo, Hidetada was firmly based 
in the Kanto region. While Ieyasu had taken annual trips to Kyoto from his retirement 
home in Sunpu, Hidetada never made similar efforts, preferring to stay in the warrior 
capital of Edo. Bakufu and court relations reached a new low when Hidetada, though 
threats and bribes, forced the new emperor, Go-Mizunoo, to marry Hidetada’s daughter. 
This was unheard of. Of course, Hidetada had waited until Ieyasu’s death to pursue this 
bold course, but by 1620, Hidetada succeeded and his daughter, Masako, was wed to the 
emperor.136  
There is one final detrimental episode which must be mentioned: the so-called 
purple robe incident. During the medieval period and until the Tokugawa had asserted 
control over the court, it was entirely an imperial prerogative to bestow imperial titles and 
purple vestments to select abbots of Buddhist temples. These robes signified the highest 
levels of the clergy, and these positions often came with great reward. The 1615 Kuge 
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Shohatto restricted the court’s exclusive freedom to present these robes. The court made 
the mistake of ignoring this directive. The bakufu responded in 1627 by stripping titles, 
and the right to don the purple vestments, from over one hundred and fifty Buddhist 
clerics. This public humiliation of the court by the bakufu prompted the abdication of Go-
Mizunoo in 1629.137 This was a clear demonstration of bakufu dominance over the court, 
and can be viewed as the apex of a culmination of actions, including the forced imperial 
visits to Nijō, that were designed to restructure the social order in favor of the warrior 
class.  
Because Hidetada had followed Ieyasu’s example and acted as the de facto ruler 
of Japan through the office of ōgosho, the court viewed Iemitsu’s early career as shogun 
as a continuation of offenses perpetrated by the bakufu to undermine traditional imperial 
authority. Therefore, when Hidetada died in 1632, the court had little reason to think that 
bokufu-court realtions would change. How wrong they were.  
 As mentioned in the previous chapter, Iemitsu seemed to have had a strained 
relationship with his father. Perhaps this is why Iemitsu reversed Hidetada’s rulings 
surrounding the purple robe incident. This not only returned honor to the imperial court, 
but did so specifically for the retired and deeply embittered emperor, Go-Mizunoo. 
Iemitsu next began making overtures to Go-Mizunoo by inviting imperial consorts to act 
as go-betweens. All of this was a prelude to Iemitsu’s grand procession to Kyoto in 1634. 
That year, Iemitsu traveled to the imperial capital with a force of 300,000 samurai. But, 
this was not simply a show of force. Iemitsu came bearing gifts: 5000 kan of silver for the 
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townsfolk, tax exemptions for Sakai, Osaka, and Nara, and priceless literature for Go-
Mizunoo. These overtures seem to have been successful, as Go-Mizunoo hosted Iemitsu 
at his palace on the same visit. To further improve relations, Iemitsu even went so far as 
to return the sole power to appoint ranks and titles to the court. This return of imperial 
perogative was no threat to bakufu supremacy, as the court was already politically de-
fanged, but it delighted Go-Mizunoo and the court.138 Why would Iemitsu act with such 
magnanimity towards the court? As will be shown in the following, Iemitsu was 
preparing to invoke the time honored warrior tradition of using the court for legitimacy.  
 
The Tōshō Daigongen Engi  
 
One of the most important projects relating to Tokugawa legitimacy was the 
Tōshō Daigongen Engi. This was an illustrated scroll, rewritten in 1640 from a 1636 
history of the founding of Nikkō Tōshōgū in order to focus more closely on the history of 
Tōshō Daigongen.  That Iemitsu used art for political and ideological purposes has been 
well established in the previous chapter. And, of all Iemitsu’s projects, Nikkō stands out 
as the grandest achievement. Furthermore, just as Iemitsu’s architectural projects at Nijō 
Castle, Taitoku-in, and Nikkō represent an evolution of architecture as a projection of 
power, the creation of the Tōshō Daigongen Engi was emblematic of the evolution of a 
more dynamic use of Tōshōgū that was first seen in the coercion of the Korean court.  
 As historian Lee Bruschke-Johnson points out, the Japanese warrior class had a 
long tradition of seeking court sanction and legitimization through formal imperial 
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documents.139 Not only were these types of documents seen as the ultimate display of 
filial piety for one’s departed ancestors, but the documents could also be used to 
commemorate shrines and temples. This latter form of documents came to be known as 
engi scrolls. Engi scrolls with accompanying illustrations were known as engi e-maki.140 
Engi scrolls generally told the mythical foundation stories of religious complexes, and 
generally centered on the founding religious figures and theology particular to the shrine 
or temple being described.  
 After Hidetada’s death, Iemitsu commissioned Tenkai to create an engi for the 
Nikkō shrine. Tenkai’s text, which was written in Chinese characters (managana) and 
contained no illustrations, was completed just in time for the grand celebrations 
punctuating the rebuilding of Tōshōgū in 1636. This first incarnation of the Nikkō engi 
was called the Tōshōsha Engi, and focused heavily on Tenkai’s form of Sannō Shinto as 
well as the history of the founding of the Nikkō shrine. These attributes, although in 
perfect accordance with engi tradition, were insufficient in Iemitsu’s eyes. Iemitsu likely 
did not appreciate the focus that Tenkai placed on himself in the passages. Furthermore, 
as we have seen, Iemitsu was not above breaking with convention in the pursuit of 
ideological legitimacy.  
 Therefore, Iemitsu commissioned a new edition of the engi, which would be 
titled, Tōshō Daigongen Engi. This title points to Iemitsu’s preference to establish a 
tradition promoting the divinity of Ieyasu, rather than a simple theological history of the 
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early Nikkō shrine. Additionally, Iemitsu was not only concerned with the content of the 
engi, but also with who would be producing the content. Iemitsu established a committee 
of talented men to undertake the project. Tenkai was the head of the group of three. 
Itakura Shigemune (1586-1656), shogunal deputy in Kyoto, was brought in to keep the 
court in line, and, Shōren-in Sonjun, an imperial prince, was also recruited, not only to 
help coerce members of the court to participate in the project, but also to help Tenkai 
write the first draft in mixed syllabary (kana majiribun).141 
Unlike the 1636 version, the 1640 engi was to have illustrations. Because this new 
pet project of the shogun was to utilize the most prominent men of talent in the land, 
Iemitsu decided that Kanō Tan’yu would paint all of the illustrations.142 The most 
important person to be tasked with writing a section in the new history of the Tokugawa 
was the retired emperor, Go-Mizunoo. By having the new and official history of the 
Tokugawa penned by the emperor himself, Iemitsu was utilizing the highest personage of 
the court to legitimate the veracity of the account. There could be no doubting a history 
penned by the retired emperor. However, Go-Mizunoo must have realized this, and was 
reluctant to participate. The retired emperor attempted to demur, claiming illness and 
muscle pains. Iemitsu overruled these excuses, and the emperor finally proceeded.143   
In addition to the retired emperor, Iemitsu carefully selected some facinating 
calligraphers to work on the revised engi. For example, although of low court rank, two 
grandsons of the last Ashikaga shogun, Yoshiaki, were tasked with writing sections of the 
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scroll. This is seen by Lee Bruschke-Johnson as a way to tie the Tokugawa bakufu to the 
Ashikaga bakufu. Furthermore, the head of the Hachijō family, prince Toshitada, was 
chosen to write the sections on Ieyasu’s victories at Osaka. This is particularly 
interesting, as Toshitada’s father had served Hideyoshi who had eventually adopted the 
Hachijō into the Toyotomi clan. By coercing Toshitada to write Ieyasu’s story, Iemitsu 
was leaving no doubt of the veracity of the account, as it was being penned by one of the 
strongest Tokugawa decenters still living.144 
While the coercion of members of the court lent legitimacy to the document, and 
the utilization of Tan’yu added magnificence, the content of the engi itself was of 
paramount importance. The 1640 scroll added significant historical episodes, some more 
dubious than others. The engi also claimed divinity at birth for Ieyasu, a bold and new 
claim which might explain Go-Mizunoo’s reluctance to participate. Another less original, 
but equally bold assertion made in the scroll was that Japan was the center of civilization 
in Asia, and that India and China were tangential entities. The scroll also addressed 
specific historical events in a light meant to legitimize the Tokugawa. For example, there 
is a telling of the political and military events between the battles of Sekigahara and 
Osaka which matter-of-factly states, among other things, that Hideyori should have 
committed ritual suicide after Sekigahara.145 Still, even as Iemitsu was rewriting 
history—as victors are wont to do—he recognized the ritual importance of the court. The 
opening section of the Tōshō Daigongen Engi reads: 
 
                                                        
144. Ibid., 166. 
145. Gerhart, The Eyes of Power, 112. 
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From the distant age of the world of the gods, throughout ten thousand worlds, the 
emperor provides one continuous thread through enthronement and succession; 
this has not changed even once. Imperial descendants inherit this transmission, 
and it is the same. In this human world, it is known that there is nothing above it; 
is there any country that governs over it? Japan, therefore, acts as the tree root, 
with India and China as branches and leaves; this is certainly true.146 
 
It is easy to understand Iemitsu’s desire to ligitimize the court, even as he sought 
legitimacy for himself and his family. The court had bestowed the title of shogun on each 
of the Tokugawa rulers, and Iemitsu wanted them to continue to do so. After the 
implementation of the Kuge Shohatto and the case of the purple robe incident—proof that 
the Tokugawa would enforce the new code—Iemitsu saw the court as an ideal 
supplementary source of legitimacy to Tōshōgū. The court no longer presented a threat to 
bakufu power, yet through tradition, the emperor and courtiers could provide added 
legitimacy that elevated the Tokugawa above other daimyo. Likewise, as the bakufu had 
become the sole patrons of the imperial court, the writers of the 1640 engi sought to 
highlight and exaggerate the role of the Tokugawa as protectors of the court, and 
therefore Japan: 
 
Certainly, the descendants of the emperor of our country have more than one last 
name, but among them the Minamoto [Genji], descendants of the fifty-sixth 
Seiwa Tennō, were brave and protected the emperor; on the point of governing 
the country, they were superior. Above all, the fame of the highly revered Tōshō 
Daigongen, who is the ancestral god [soshin] of the present-day Tokugawa, 
cannot be quantified in words of in writing. When we try to explain his fame, it is 
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like comparing one drop of water to a great sea, or a single hair to the hairs on 
nine cows—it cannot be done.147 
 
The above passage makes clear that, while the emperor is what makes Japan unique and 
superior, it is the Tokugawa, supposedly descended from the Minamoto, who are meant 
to rule. By implying that the Tokugawa are also the protectors of the emperor, Iemitsu 
cleverly makes the Tokugawa the indispensable guardians of Japan.  
 Iemitsu also seems to have had some insecurities regarding his father’s and 
grandfather’s breaking of the multiple oaths they had sworn to Toyotomi Hideyoshi 
regarding Hideyori’s investiture as hegemon.148 The following is a select section on the 
fate of the Toyotomi, written under duress by the former follower and clansman of the 
Toyotomi: 
 
When the Battle of Sekigahara in Mino was won, [Toyotomi] Hideyori should 
have committed suicide, but he was sent to his own castle [Ōsaka], with some loss 
of land, through benevolence. However, soon Lord Minamoto’s kindness was 
forgotten. In the autumn of the previous year [Keichō 19 (1614)], many ronin had 
joined [Hideyori] at Ōsaka Castle and were planning a rebellion. This was soon 
detected, and [Ieyasu and Hidetada] left their palaces at Sunpu and Bushū 
[Musashi/Edo], amassing over 500,000 horsemen and surrounding the castle 
[Ōsaka]. They raised the battle cry and attacked. The soldiers fought valiantly to 
protect the castle, but in the end they were subdued. Because peace was requested 
from within, the moat was filled in and the mud walls torn down, and everyone 
                                                        
147. Ibid., 113-14. 
148. Ieyasu and Hidetada both took multiple oaths of loyalty to Hideyoshi’s son, 
Hideyori. See Berry, Hideyoshi, 234-35. 
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was able to flee safely… However, in the spring of this year [1615], another 
insurrection occurred, and it was rumored that they would burn Kyoto. Everyone 
in the city gathered together like ants and then scattered like flies…It was said 
that the Ōsaka forces numbered between 150,000 and 160,000…Arrows flew and 
swords slashed as they fought. Inside the castle, because a fire had started, 
Hideyori and his mother [Yodogimi] fled to the Yamazato[maru] and committed 
suicide on the eight day. Their close male and female attendants also committed 
suicide, and the entire castle went up in flames, making the destruction 
complete…From this time forth, the four seas and the eight borders were 
administered by Lord Minamoto, and it was a time when wind and rain were in 
harmony [the country was peaceful].149 
 
In the opening line of this passage, the Tōshō Daigongen Engi states that “Hideyori 
should have committed suicide” after Sekigahara. Of course, this would have been quite 
convenient for the Tokugawa, but there is no indication that such an action was expected 
from Hideyori. Instead, Ieyasu’s actions toward his former ally’s son show a man still 
acting in accordance with the multiple oaths he swore to Hideyoshi prior to his death in 
1598. Ieyasu had to wait for the pretext mentioned in the engi—the gathering of ronin 
and the threat to Kyoto—before attacking Osaka Castle. Furthermore, the claim that 
“from this time forth…the country was peaceful” is also rather spurious. The Shimabara 
rebellion took place in 1638. Still, this passage illustrates how Iemitsu was able to use the 
politico-religious movement founded at Nikkō in conjunction with the imperial court to 
rewrite history and claim supreme legitimacy over political power in Japan.  
The Tōshō Daigongen Engi was not simply stored away to be kept by scribes and 
only taken out for festivals, although it was displayed at these times. Rather, the 1640 
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engi was circulated among the three most important Tokugawa branch families, the 
gosanke. This was an obvious way to make clear to the Shinpan daimyo exactly what the 
official history of the Tokugawa would be, and that Iemitsu was in an unassailable 
position of power as the grandson of their divine lord.150  
Iemitsu’s use of the Nikkō shrine as a conduit through which to manipulate both 
the imperial courts of Kyoto and Korea clearly shows a more active utilization of Tōshō 
Daigongen than the early projects. Be that as it may, without the rebuilding of the shrine 
in 1636 and the establishment of shogunal pilgrimages as a lavish spectacle, neither of 
Iemitsu’s court related projects would have been likely to succeed. Some historians, such 
as Lee Brunschke-Johnson, have argued that all of these projects were planned from the 
beginning. Unfortunately, the evidence to support this either does not exist, or has not 
been found. What is clear, however, is that Iemitsu succeeded in assuming the agency 
behind the Nikkō shrine without undermining Tenkai, and then used Tōshōgū to elevate 
the status of the Tokugawa bakufu above both the daimyo and the imperial court.  
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CHAPTER V 
CODA 
 
 The Tōshōgū Shrine in Nikkō was a project that received constant attention and 
support from various high level bakufu officials, including the second and third shoguns. 
The preeminent cultural, religious, and political advisers, Tenkai and Sūden, as well as 
top level daimyo such as Honda Masazumi, all weighed in on the creation and 
perpetuation of Tōshōgū. Why then, has this central tool for political legitimacy been 
given such scant treatment by western historians of Japan? As discussed in the 
introduction, a combination of factors has led historians away from the religious sources 
of ideological legitimacy during the Tokugawa bakufu’s early period. First, the focus of 
historians of the early Edo period on institutional history led to detailed studies on the 
edicts, legal codes, and other logistical controls enacted by the bakufu, but ignored the 
vast resources spent to shore up ideological legitimacy. Second, the focus by 
theoretically-oriented historians on what they saw as the watershed moment in Japanese 
history—the Meiji Restoration—brought the focus of historians of Japan to the 
bakumatsu period, and further away from the aspects that engendered the Tokugawa 
peace in the first place. Finally, the focus by intellectual historians on Neo-Confucianism, 
which was only popularized and institutionalized in the Eighteenth Century, also worked 
to keep historians occupied with research on later times. That said, it is absolutely time to 
reexamine the early Edo period and its sources of success.  
 The early Tokugawa period witnessed the completion of a shift from the authority 
of power to the power of authority. This shift can also be explained as an evolution from 
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a primarily repressive state to one that maintained legitimacy mainly through ideology. 
Under the first three shoguns, two-hundred and thirty-one domains were seized or 
significantly diminished while another two-hundred and eighty-one daimyo were 
transferred to solidify Tokugawa control. After the death of Iemitsu in 1651, the practice 
of attainder came to a near stop.151 Of course this was partially due to the successful 
implementation of institutional controls that had developed during the unification period 
under Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and Ieyasu, but rules and regulations alone do not explain 
the Tokugawa success.  
 The unique source of Tokugawa success can be found in the development of 
emerging forms of politico-religious sources of ideology. Nobunaga toyed with the idea 
of being deified, but his assassination at Honnōji in 1582 prevented him from actualizing 
his plans for independence from the court. Hideyoshi took these developments one step 
further and was deified as a tutelary deity. Unfortunately for the Toyotomi clan, the 
inability of Hideyoshi to produce a ready-and-able heir allowed Ieyasu to seize power. 
Ieyasu had shrewdly observed the first two unifiers and was able to reproduce and 
combine all of the essential elements of success: a stable political system, a capable heir 
as well as an arrangement to continue the Tokugawa lineage, and a source of 
transcendental authority in the form of a politico-religious movement centered on his own 
deified persona: Tōshō Daigongen.  
 Clearly, much is also owed to other agents in this endeavor. Tenkai, who seems to 
have wildly exaggerated Ieyasu’s posthumous wishes by inventing a new theology to 
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legitimize the Tokugawa, provided early impetus behind the propagation of Tōshōgū. 
Hidetada, too, deserves credit for supporting Tenkai’s grandiose plans. But, it was 
Iemitsu who truly took the Nikkō shrine and its accompanying religious movement to 
amazing heights. It was no coincidence that the bakufu reached its zenith under Iemitsu, 
both in terms of political and ideological power, both of which the third shogun pursued 
through Tōshōgū.  
 Capitalizing on Tenkai’s religious creation, Iemitsu laid the groundwork for his 
dynamic utilization of the Nikkō shrine by rebuilding the shrine in a magnificent style 
reminiscent of his earlier architectural projects. This undertaking was followed by a 
number of projects, each designed to further enhance Tokugawa prestige. First, Iemitsu 
increased the frequency of pilgrimages to Nikkō. These spectacles highlighted the divine 
investiture granted to the bakufu by Ieyasu. Next, Iemitsu coerced the Korean court to 
send their own pilgrimages, often bearing gifts with politico-religious significance. These 
pilgrimages were public affairs, meant to show bakufu legitimacy on an international 
scale. Finally, Iemitsu and Tenkai’s Tōshō Daigongen Engi was a way for Iemitsu to 
enshrine a favorable history of the Tokugawa that was directly legitimized by the 
imperial court in Kyoto.   
 This is the first study on Tōshōgū that has examined the shrine from its inception 
through its aggrandizement. Furthermore, by examining the personal and political aims of 
the central figures involved with Tōshōgū within their historical context, this study has 
explained why Tōshōgū was founded, elevated, and utilized as an ideological tool. Unlike 
any other source of legitimacy, Tōshōgū was exclusive to the Tokugawa. This exclusivity 
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offers the answer to the question: How were the Tokugawa able to stabilize Japan and 
prepare it for the rapid modernization that would come in the following Meiji period?  
 At the outset of this project, I sought to answer a number of questions relating to 
the establishment and propagation of the Tōshōgū Shrine in Nikkō. Primarily concerned 
with how and why Tōshōgū was founded as well as how the shrine was utilized as a 
source for legitimacy, I focused on contextualizing primary documents within the 
political environment of early modern Japan. Despite this initial focus on political 
ideology, it is obvious that the separation of political ideology and religious ideology is 
an impossibility.  
 As is often the case, and although I have answered some of the initial queries that 
inspired this study, I am left with more questions than answers regarding the significance 
of Tōshōgū. In particular, Iemitsu’s pretentions toward elevating the sacred nature of the 
Tokugawa to rival the imperial court present an intriguing avenue of further investigation. 
Clearly, the rebuilding of the Nikkō shrine on its twentieth anniversary coupled with the 
elevation of Ieyasu’s shrine to miya and the mandated visits by imperial reihishi were 
meant by Iemitsu to elevate the status of the Tokugawa in relation to the imperial court. 
Still, Iemitsu’s machinations beg one other question: In what other ways did the third 
shogun, or the later Tokugawa shoguns for that matter, seek to propagate the notion of a 
sacred realm? This question of the creation of a sacred Tokugawa authority will require a 
deeper investigation of other sources of public ideology. In particular, a thorough 
examination of documents such as the Tokugwa Jikki may help to shed light on these 
issues. While this chronicle of the Tokugawa is often utilized by scholars as an accurate 
catalogue of the events and aims of the bakufu, it is my distinct impression that the 
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Tokugawa Jikki would be better used as an indicator of Tokugawa ideology. That is to 
say, just as the Tōshō Daigongen Engi projects a particular and favorable narrative of the 
Tokugawa, the Tokugawa Jikki presents an idealized version of the clan’s history. 
Perhaps it is in the conceptual space between the history projected by the Tokugawa and 
a divergent and more objective past that both the successes and shortcomings of the 
Tokugawa should be explored.  
 Ultimately, the genesis and aggrandizement of Tōshōgū highlighted the 
willingness of the Tokugawa to build on emerging politico-religious movements in an 
effort to create a sacred authority traceable solely to the Tokugawa. Daimyo, the imperial 
court, and foreign envoys were all manipulated by the vehicle of Tōshōgū in ways that 
raised the status of the bakufu and helped to secure a lasting legitimacy.  
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